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"According to an Unnamed Official":
Reconsidering the Consequences of Confidential
Source Agreements When Promises Are
Broken by the Press
I. INTRODUCTION
Don't you wish you had a nickel for every time you have seen or heard a news
report that attributes the juiciest information to an "informed source" or a "senior
official"? Don't you think it would make you a wealthy person? It might. At least
that's what a reliable highly placed source who asked not to be identified tells
me.'
Leaking information to the press is an unpreventable function of our
modem, news-saturated society. The American political, business, and
social arenas thrive on "inside news," and in a country where information
can function as power, supply will always strive to meet the demands of
the news-hungry public.2 Even the most vocal critics of modem journal-
ism standards would likely agree that not all leaks' are bad. As one com-
mentator has aptly noted, "[Leaks] may even be an essential safety valve
for the democratic processes to work."4 However, leaks have their un-
1. ClarerLce Page, Leaks: Democracy's Safety Valve, CtIc. TRwi., Oct. 27, 1991, at
3C.
2. This trend has proven to be particularly problematic in the political arena. In
1971, a judge dismissed the indictment of Daniel Ellsberg for supplying the Pentagon
Papers to the New York Times and Washington Post. Howard Kurtz, Calls for Probe
of Leak Echo History of Failure, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1991, at A4. Since that time,
"successive [presidential] administrations and Congress have sought to plug leaks of classi-
fied, sensitive or embarrassing information." Id.
3. This Comment uses the term "leak" in reference to persons who supply inside
information in exchange for a promise of confidentiality. For a typology of confiden-
tial. sources, see Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confi-
dential Pres,-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 623-32 (1991).
4. Page, supra note 1, at 3M. Page classifies leaks into two principal categories.
First, there are those leaks that are voluntarily offered to the press. Second are leaks
elicited from a source, usually someone with a strong desire to report some sort of
scandal but -who lacks the means to report their story. Id.
Scott Armstrong, former Washington Post reporter and co-author of The Breth-
ren, offers his own dual categorization of leaks: those that leak in and those that
leak out. Id. "Leaks out" are intended to send a strong public message and are best
seemly side as well. They can be vehicles for bitter character assassina-
tions and political smear campaigns.' As the Senate confirmation hear-
ings of two recent Supreme Court nominees indicate, no one is immune
from the power of a confidential source." In the words of one media
critic, "No one ever apologizes when the leaked information turns out to
be wrong."'
When journalists turn to insiders for information, they frequently
promise their sources confidentiality in exchange for valuable informa-
tion." Recently, however, members of the press have shown a tendency
to breach confidentiality agreements.' These journalists frequently justify
illustrated by the classic whistle-blowing scenario. Id. "Leaks in" are disclosures that
an inside source believes will impact the upper levels of his or her own organization.
Id. President Lyndon Johnson is thought to have escalated the use of "leaks in"
because of his profound sensitivity to criticism. DAVID SHAW, PRESS WATCH 66 (1984).
Administration officials were forced to leak their stories to journalists in order to
make their dissenting opinions known. Id.
During the 1970s, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger functioned as an often-
quoted "high-ranking source" from the State Department. Page, supra note 1, at 3C.
He frequently staged "deep background" press conferences during which he offered
choice tidbits of information regarding matters of foreign diplomacy. Id. Former
Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee decided to boycott the conferences for a while,
but he eventually gave in when other major media groups refused to join in his
protest. Id
5. In a fiery commentary appearing in The Washington Times, media watchdogs
Reed Irvine and Joe Goulden of Accuracy in Media (AIM) suggest that a request for
anonymity demonstrates that a source knows he is doing "dirty work." Reed Irvine &
Joe Goulden, Should NPR Unmask the Leaker?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at F4.
6. While "sources" may include books, periodicals, and other forms of documenta-
ry evidence, this Comment uses the term to refer to persons who supply information.
Larry Sabato, a professor at the University of Virginia, has revealed that it was
an embittered former girlfriend who made the initial allegations that President
Reagan's nominee to the Supreme Court, Judge Ginsburg, used marijuana years before
his nomination. Irvine & Goulden, supra note 5, at F4. More recently, a source
leaked allegations of sexual harassment to Nina Tottenberg of National Public Radio
(NPR) made by Professor Anita Hill against Justice Clarence Thomas. Id. The source
originally provided Tottenberg with Hill's affidavit to the FBI under a cloak of confi-
dentiality and later became the focal point of televised hearings which gripped the
nation. Id. The latter incident so enraged Senator John Danforth that he threatened
any senator involved in the leak to NPR with expulsion. Id.
7. Page, supra note 1, at 3C (quoting Norman Ornstein of the American Enter-
prise Institute).
8. The seventh article of the Declaration of Rights and Obligations of Journalists,
adopted by the International Federation of Journalists in 1972, imposes a duty on the
media to "observe professional secrecy and not to divulge the source of information
obtained in confidence." Patricia Wilhelm, The Protection of Sources; The Media:
Ways to Freedom, UNESCO COURIER, Sept. 1990, at 16. For a more complete dis-
cussion of the actual restraints imposed by journalists' codes of ethics, see infa text
accompanying notes 13338 and 433-36.
9. This trend caused some commentators to speculate as to whether NPR's Nina
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their disregard for promises made to confidential sources by pointing to
the newsworthiness of the source and the public interest served in re-
vealing the source's identity. ° This was the very argument recently
heard by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. [hereinafter Cohen V]." In Cohen, many of the
nation's most prominent news organizations filed briefs supporting the
contention -that the press has a First Amendment right to break promises
to sources in the interest of disseminating newsworthy information. 2 A
sharply divided Court rejected this argument, holding that a news organi-
zation can be sued and held liable for damages for breaking its promise
to keep a news source's identity secret. 3 During oral arguments, media
Tottenberg would choose to reveal the identity of the source of the Hill affidavit.
Irvine & Gouden, supra note 5, at F4. They wondered if Tottenberg would take ad-
vantage of the powerful opportunity to sabotage the career of a United States Sena-
tor in light of the threat that he or she might be expelled from office. Id.
10. During a speech at Brown University, Michael Gartner, president of NBC News,
addressed the issue of the disclosure of "public interest" news that sources have
leaked to the press. Id, Gartner was asked what he would do if the Federal Bureau
of Investigations (FBI) were to offer him videotapes revealing extramarrital activities
of the Reverend Martin Luther King. Id. Gartner responded that the key issue would
not be King's marital infidelity. Id. Rather, the proper focus of a news story would
be the FBI's peddling of the videos. Id.
11. 14 Media L, Rep. (BNA) 1460 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987) [hereinafter Cohen 1]
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment) , 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288
(Minn. Dist. Ct. 1988) [hereinafter Cohen II] (denying motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and, alternatively, motion for new trial), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) [hereinafter Cohen III], affd in part
and rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Cohen IV], cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 678 (1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) [hereinafter Cohen V]. The case
was brought by Dan Cohen, a political campaign consultant who sued the Minneapo-
lis Star-Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer Press after the two newspapers identified
him in articles appearing in 1982. See infra text accompanying notes 213-80.
12. Amicus briefs were filed by the Associated Press, the American Newspaper
Publishers Association, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Gannett
Company, the New York Times Company, and the Times Mirror Company. Irvine &
Goulden, supra note 5, at F4. While conceding that the newspapers involved in
Cohen were "far from orthodox" in their approach to the confidential source dilem-
ma, amici asserted that editors have the right to determine whether a source's identi-
ty is more newsworthy than the information provided. Id.
13. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2519. The decision elicited a flurry of criticism from
media commentators. A spokesperson for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press predicted a flood of similar lawsuits and voiced her concern about judicial
intrusion in the newsroom. James Vicini, Supreme Court Says News Media Can Be
Sued for Revealing Source, REUTERS, June 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, REUTERS File. However, Accuracy in Media (AIM), a conservative media
attorney John French argued that publishing the name of a newsworthy
source brings out "the whole truth" surrounding an important news sto-
ry.4 In a fiery response, Justice Marshall asked whether in publishing
"the whole truth" the newspapers had also printed their "broken promis-
es" to their source. When French conceded that they had not, Justice
Marshall retorted, "You didn't publish a/ the truth."5
This Comment focuses upon the present contours of First Amendment
protections for the press and applies these constitutional guarantees to
the reporter-source relationship. Part I examines the historic role of the'
press and traces the growing popularity of confidential sources in all
realms of the media. In addition, Part I addresses the delicate and often
uncertain relationship that arises between a reporter and her source, and
concludes that this relationship might be inherently flawed.
Part II addresses the important consequences that arise when a source
seeks legal redress for the breach of a confidentiality agreement. Courts
have employed several models in order to frame the First Amendment
issues and contract issues raised, each having a significant impact on the
decision to grant or deny relief to an exposed source. The first model
relies upon the operation of traditional contract law, as opposed to tort
law, and presumptively enforces reporter-source agreements as voluntary
promises. The second model, the promissory estoppel model, appears to
modify a strict contractual analysis of source disclosure through a selec-
tive examination of the context in which the agreement arose and a de-
termination of whether a refusal to enforce the promise would result in
injustice. However, this Comment suggests that the promissory estoppel
model focuses too narrowly on the intent of the parties, consequently
failing to reach a true balance-of-interests approach. The third model,
based upon the historic notion of a free press, looks to the First Amend-
ment for absolute immunity for reporters who disclose their source's
identity. While the argument that imposing contract damages violates the
media's First Amendment freedoms is persuasive, it does not appear to
be a viable alternative in the wake of recent Supreme Court opinion."6
Part I concludes by focusing on the various methodologies applied in
three recent source disclosure cases.
Part III focuses on the shortcomings of the three predominant ap-
proaches to source claims and identifies considerations relevant to the
development of a new standard that would provide a better balance be-
tween the conflicting interests at stake. This section also examines the
watchdog group, praised the Court's ruling based upon its belief that it will help to
ensure that reporters honor confidentiality agreements. Id.
14.. Irvine & Goulden, supra note 5, at F4.
15. Id, (emphasis added).
16. See infr notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
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emergence of the independent common law tort of breach of confidence
as an alternative to current models and proposes that its adoption may
be warranted in light of the growing number of source claims. This tort
would extend breach of confidence protection beyond the limitations of
existing case law, yet it is compatible with the principles underlying the
First Amendment and traditional contract law. Finally, the Comment
identifies privileges and limitations that, regardless of the standard adopt-
ed, must apply in response to countervailing public interests and First
Amendment considerations.
II. THE MEDIA, COURTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION:
AN OVERVIEW
A. Constitutional Shelter for the Press
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
7
It is well established that any abridgement of speech or of the press
triggers certain protections granted to all Americans by the First Amend-
ment. 8 Indeed, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, as well
as to the free flow of information, is commensurate with the most funda-
mental civil rights."9 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the Supreme
Court declared that the principle of "freedom of expression upon public
questions" lies at the heart of the First Amendment, and thereby estab-
lished a constitutional basis for limiting the liability of the press in defa-
mation actions involving public officials.2' The case involved a libel ac-
tion brought by the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama during
the civil rights movement of the 1960s.' The Respondent alleged that an
advertisement describing violent acts against Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191.
19. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (declaring that the First
Amendment; was designed to maintain "free political discussion to the end that gov-
ernment may be responsive to the will of the people").
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. Id. at 269. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) ("Public discus-
sion is a political duty; and ... a fundamental principle of American government.").
Alexander Meiklejohn characterized the Sullivan decision as "an occasion for dancing
in the streets." Kalven, supra note 18, at 221 n.125.
22. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
and other African-American protesters implicated him in civil rights abus-
es.' The Court found in favor of the newspaper, holding that in order to
preserve an environment where truth could be vigorously pursued, a
public official must show "actual malice" before he can recover from the
defendant.' Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan defined actual
malice as a statement made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. "' The Court justified
the heightened standard of proof by pointing to the nation's historical
"commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may... include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."' From this principle, the Court concluded that the
necessary protection of public debate should afford the press substantial
"breathing space. "' 7 Hence, some margin of error must be allowed in
order to ensure that the fear of error does not discourage the press from
actively pursuing truth.'
Sullivan represents a highwater mark in the Court's recognition of the
media's fundamental role in American democracy. Several subsequent
Supreme Court opinions during the 1960s and '70s bolstered Sullivan's
constitutional protections. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,' the
Court broadened Sullivan's rule on "public officials"' by extending it to
"matters of public or general concern.""' The effect was to shift the fo-
cus of the First Amendment debate from the status of the plaintiff to the
nature of the issue at hand. The Court rationalized the extension of
Sullivan on the principle that "the commitment to robust debate on pub-
23. Id, at 256-57.
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. Id. at 280.
26. Id. at 270.
27. Id. at 272 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
28. In the words of Justice Brennan, the press "may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, be-
cause of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having
to do so." Id. at 279. Justice Brennan based much of his analysis on the history
flowing from the Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired by its own
terms in 1801), which made it a crime to defame Congress or the President. Id.
Although the Act was never challenged in the Supreme Court, as far as Justice
Brennan was concerned, it established that "[t]he right of free public discussion of
the stewardship of public officials was . . . a fundamental principle of the American
form of government." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275.
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
30. Sullivan's rule on "public officials" was extended to "public figures" in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), where the Court determined that Butts,
the athletic director of the University of Georgia, was a "public figure" for purposes
of applying the actual malice standard. Id. at 154-55.
31. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44.
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lic issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment" must be recog-
nized "by extending constitutional protection for all discussion and com-
munication involving matters of public or general concern, without re-
gard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."32
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the Court recognized the difficulties
inherent in administering Rosenbloom's public issue test, 4 and once
again shifted the focus of press protections back to the plaintiffs sta-
tus.' While Gertz distinguished private individuals from "public offi-
cials" and "public figures" for the purpose of finding the press liable in
defamation actions,' the Court also recognized that private persons may
become public figures for the limited purpose of a particular controversy
involving important matters of public concern." Such a broad definition
of a "public figure" ensures that members of the press will remain free to
pursue important public issues without the fear that private individuals
who are in the public eye will successfully litigate a claim. This would
effectively undermine the heightened protection afforded by Sullivan.8
2. Constitutional Protections and the Role of the Press
While the press has fared reasonably well under the constitutional
shelter afforded by New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan' and its proge-
32. Id. at 43-44.
33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
34. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (identifying Justice
Brennan's analysis as a "newsworthiness" standard with dangerous implications for
the freedoms afforded the press).
35. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
36. The Court defined the latter as individuals who have "achieve[d] such pervasive
fame or notoriety that [they become] . . . public figure[s] for all purposes and in all
contexts." I& at 357. On the other hand, one can "voluntarily [inject] himself or [be]
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby [become] a public figure for a
limited range of issues." Id. The Court reasoned that public officials and public fig-
ures are better able to defend their positions because they have greater access to the
press. Id, at 344-45. Consequently, they assume a greater risk of injury by their will-
ing participation in public issues and controversies; in contrast, private plaintiffs
neither have the same degree of access to the press nor voluntarily seek publicity.
Id. at 344.46. However, the Court did acknowledge that the public/private figure
distinction is not always an easy one and may rest upon an analysis of "the nature
and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to
the defamation." Id. at 357.
37. Id at 352.
38. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
ny,' the Court has established that neither the media nor the ordinary
citizen enjoys an absolute right to free speech. On the contrary, the ex-
tent of the shelter guaranteed by the Constitution depends upon the
value of the particular First Amendment interest at issue and the
strength of the competing interest involved." Consequently, throughout
its history, the Supreme Court has devoted much of its attention to iden-
tifying and shaping the constitutionally protected role of the press.'
The Court has focused upon three primary functions served by the
press which form its fundamental role in society. First, the press serves
as a conduit and springboard for the expression of individual opinions
and ideas.' This function preserves the individual's autonomy by assur-
ing a forum for the expression and dissemination of her thoughts." Sec-
ond, the press acts as an educator and informant for the public's bene-
fit.' This concept embodies the theory of self-government when the
40. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (finding corportation
to be "public figure" and therefore required to prove "actual malice" in product
disparagement case).Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (broad-
ening the "public official" definition to include "public figures").
41. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (determining the extent of constitutional protection by weighing First Amend-
ment concerns against state interest in protecting reputation).
42. See, e.g., Florida Star, Inc. v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (holding statute
that prevents publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information about a victim of
sexual assault unconstitutional); Gannett v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381-83 (1979)
(holding that the right to a fair trial belongs to the accused, not the media);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (holding that First Amendment does not
relieve newspaper reporter of obligation to respond to grand jury subpoena); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (recognizing right to ban publication of obscene
material and material which incites a community to overthrow its government).
43. See Note, The Right of the Public and the Press to Gather Iformation, 87
HARv. L REV. 1505, 1507-16 (1974).
44. The "personal right theory," the dominant doctrine for many years, regards
freedom of the press as an individual right. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450 (1938) (declaring freedom of the press as a personal right); see also Anthony Lew-
is, A Preferred Position for Journalism, 7 HomSTRA L REV. 595, 626 (1979). This
theory views the First Amendment's speech and press clauses as virtually synony-
mous. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451-52. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. In time, the Supreme
Court began to focus on the societal interests served by the press, aside from
journalists' individual interest in publishing. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (stating that "an untrammeled press [is] a vital source of
public information"). However, the Court has not completely abandoned the "personal
right theory." See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (quoting Lovell,
303 U.S. at 450, 452) (declaring that "freedom of the press is a fundamental personal
right not limited to newspapers and periodicals").
45. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Justice Frankfurter's summation of this view demonstrates the tension between
this theory and the "personal right" approach: "Freedom of the press . . . is not an
end in itself but a means to the end of a free society." Id. However, it appears that
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press offers its own criticism and fosters open debate among the citizen-
ry.' The press is protected in this capacity in order to deliver to the
public information necessary for the exercise of democratic rights."7
Third, the media serve a unique role in the constitutional system of
checks and balances. This concept holds the government accountable to
the people through the uninhibited reporting of political activities.'
In addition, the constitutional protections for these primary functions
of the press ensure that journalists may carry out their work through
both newsgathering9 and publication activities.' Consequently, the Su-
preme Court has increasingly focused on newsgathering and publication
even Justice Frankfurter was unwilling to abandon the personal right theory, noting
that freedom of the press "is no greater than the liberty of every citizen of the
Republic." Id. at 364.
46. Media scholars Langley and Levine contend that "[t]here are very few 'givens'
in First Amendment jurisprudence, but among them is the proposition that the dis-
senination of information about government is the core value to be protected under
the rubric of 'freedom of speech, or of the press.'" Monica Langley & Lee Levine,
Branzburg Revisited Confidential Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO.
WASH. L REV. 13, 34 (1988). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
492 (1975) (stating that "[w]ithout the information provided by the press most of
us ... would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the adminis-
tration of government generally").
47. See David M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know,"
7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 579, 590 n.52 (1980) (stating that Alexis de Tocqueville long
ago recognized the vital role of the press in a democracy).
48. In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), the Court declared. "The press serves
and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by gov-
ernmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elect-
ed by the people responsible to all the people ... ." Id, at 219.
49. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972) (recognizing that
newsgathering is constitutionally protected). The Court stated that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id.
at 681. However, the Branzburg Court found that the newsgathering privilege does
not allow reporters to withhold the identity of a confidential source from a grand
jury. Id. at 697. See generally, Note, supra note 43.
50. The Court has granted substantially more protection to publication activities
because it directly involves journalists in the constitutional structure of our democrat-
ic system. For example, the press receives almost absolute protection against prior
restraint on what it may publish. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (denying government's request to enjoin publication
of the Pentagon Papers). Furthermore, The Supreme Court has extended protection of
the media to include- cases involving punishment after publication of a story. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (ruling against
conviction under statute prohibiting publication of names of judges who were sub-
jects of confidential investigation by state commission).
freedoms in determining the scope of constitutional restrictions on ef-
forts to inhibit public access to newsworthy information. In Branzburg v.
Hayes,6' the Court recognized that "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."' According to
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,'
Branzburg stands for two propositions. First, it holds that government
has no constitutional obligation to "justify under the stringent standard
of First Amendment review every regulation that might affect in some
tangential way the availability of information to the news media."' Sec-
ond, the holding recognizes that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections."' "An informed public depends on accurate
and effective reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain for
himself the information needed for intelligent discharge of his political
responsibilities .... [The press] is the means by which the people re-
ceive the free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government."'
B. The Growing Dependence on Confidential Sources
Overwhelming evidence indicates that the press cannot fulfill its
newsgathering and publication activities without the help of confidential
sources." Every day the average newspaper and wire service relies upon
such familiar sources as the immortal "senior staff official," the loyal
"friend close to the victim," and the all-knowing "witness at the scene."'
Reporter Bob Woodward's relationship with "Deep Throat" during the
Watergate years' led to the once-popular belief that media reliance on
51. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
52. Id. at 681. However, the Court declined to extend constitutional protections to
newsgathering from private persons and groups allegedly engaged in illegal activity.
Id. at 703-09.
53. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
54. Id. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
56. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. See JAMES H. DYGERT, THE INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST: FOLK HEROES OF A NEW
ERA, 150-51 (1976). Investigative journalist Dygert characterizes the cultivation of
sources as an art which requires "a delicate touch and constant attention." Id. at 150.
He cautions journalists not to reject information offered off the record because the
information could lead to an identifiable source. Id. at 151. Alternatively, the journal-
ist might persuade the original source to go on the record. d L
58. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE
SPEECH IN AMERICA 227 (1980) (quoting editor who claims that overwhelming number
of stories derive from confidential sources); SHAW, supra note 4, at 56-57 (major
American newspapers publish large percentage of stories quoting anonymous sources).
59. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1974).
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unnamed sources is a relatively new phenomenon.' However, history
reveals that the use of confidential sources dates as far back as 1812. In
that year, Nathanial Rounsevell, an editor for the Alexandria Herald,
received a contempt citation from Congress for his refusal to identify the
sources of a news story." President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appears
to have ushered in the modem era of confidential sources by insisting
that the press not use direct quotes from White House news conferenc-
es.' Media scholars and other commentators tend to agree that since
the 1940s, the use of confidential sources has reached astronomical pro-
portions."8 The rapid increase over the past half-century is largely attrib-
uted to secretive politicians and a journalistic standard that now accepts
stories founded upon the comments of a "source close to the Presi-
dent."" Ironically, publishers and editors who make the rare decision to
forbid the use of an unnamed source are often perceived as the victims
of political pressure, rather than persons making an effort to improve the
quality of their profession.
While the use of confidential sources is quite popular among today's
journalists, readers and viewing audiences do not share the media's en-
thusiasm.' Recent revelations of bogus sources and suspicious relation-
60. See SHAW, supra note 4, at 66.
61. See Linda Himelstein, A Dirty Job, and Many Don't Want to Do It, THE RE-
CORDER, Nov. 8, 1991, at 2; see also Ex Parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 471-72
(C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375) (holding journalist in contempt for refusing to reveal
source of information regarding Mexican treaty discussed in secret Senate meetings).
62. His successor, President Harry Truman, chose to invoke Roosevelt's edict when
he assumed office. See SHAw, supra note 4, at 65.
63. The use of unnamed sources is especially popular in the nation's capital.
Former Los Angeles Times reporter David Shaw points to presidents as the worst
offenders. Id, He contends that the Kennedy Administration was well known for its
practice of leaking stories attributed to anonymous sources close to the President. Id
The author further claims that Lyndon Johnson's presidency ushered in a novel use
of unnamed sources. Id. It seems that Johnson's extreme sensitivity to criticism
struck fear in the hearts of administration officials. Therefore, Johnson's aides were
forced to leak news to the media for the simple purpose of making their dissenting
opinions known to the White House. Id. at 66. The Watergate era exacerbated the
problems associated with anonymous sources in two respects. First, sources came to
recognize the legal risks of being identified by the press. Id. Further, Shaw asserts
that Watergate ushered in the "scoop" mentality, which pressures journalists to out-
perform their competitors. Id.
64. See id. at 66.
65. See, e.g., Henry Rosin, WAMU Talks Mostly Out of the Left Side of Its Mouth,
WASH. TImi!,s, Nov. 9, 1991, at D2 (declaring that reporter Nina Tottenberg should
reveal identity of source who leaked Professor Anita Hill's affidavit claiming Justice
ships with anonymous insiders have left the readers and viewers skepti-
cal, if not angry, at the media's abuse of public trust.' In 1981, the pub-
lic was confronted with the ugly confession of a Pulitizer Prize-winning
author who admitted that she had fabricated the child heroin addict por-
trayed in her story, "Jimmy's World."' Since that time, opinions of re-
porters and editors suggest that the public lacks faith in the existence of
most anonymous sources cited by journalists.' Public opinion took an-
other downturn when the Iran-Contra affair revealed that journalists
often develop cozy relationships with their confidential informants.'
This situation presents its own significant problems when an intimate
relationship causes a reporter to compromise professional integrity in
order to retain the services of an informative source." Thus, the jour-
nalist does not fulfill his duty to gather the complete facts, and neglects
his responsibility to verify the truth.7' Finally, overreliance on confiden-
tial sources discourages journalists from actively pursuing credible sourc-
Clarence Thomas sexually harassed her); Irvine & Goulden, supra note 5, at F4
(characterizing reporter who habitually relies upon anonymous sources for controver-
sial stories about public officials as a "scalp hunter"); cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 692-93 (1972) (agreement of confidentiality should not make parties immune
from consequences of violating. established law).
66. See LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENzY: How ATTACK JOURNAISM HAS
TRANFORMED AMERICAN PoLITCs 200-03, 278 (1991). A random-sample telephone survey
conducted by Cable News Network (CNN) in 1989 revealed that Americans, when
asked to choose the professional group with the lowest ethical standard, placed journal-
ists second on their list following lawyers by a mere percentage point. Id. at 202,
278.
67. See Ira R. Allen, UPI, April 16, 1981, available in LEXIS, NEXIS LIBRARY, UPI
File. Reflecting on the discovery of Cooke's fabrication, Washington columnist Sandy
Grady called it "a black day" in the history of journalism. Id. Grady suggests that the
competitive profession of journalism should share in the discomfort of the revelation
and perhaps engage in some soul-searching of its own. Id.
68. See SHAW, supra note 4, at 60-61 (anonymous sources suspected to be bogus).
69. See Jonathan Alter, When Sources Get Immunity: Was North Pampered?,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 54. In spite of their suspicions that Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North was a key player in the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan Contras,
journalists refrained from agressively pursuing the story because North had proven to
be a reliable confidential source of inside information. Id. The first news stories de-
tailing one of the most complicated and scandal-ridden events of the 1980's first
appeared in November 1986 and were followed by three investigations headed by the
Tower Commission, Congress, and a special federal prosecutor. North was convicted
of helping to provide covert assistance to Nicaraguan forces by means of profits from
arms sales to Iran. However, the multicount conviction was eventually overturned on
appeal. See SABATo, supra note 66, at 19-20.
70. See Alter, supra note 69, at 54 (confidentiality agreement arising out of Iran-
Contra scandal prevented reporters from scrutinizing role of North). See also SABATO,
supra note 66, at 102 (local editors refrained from being first to break story of
mayor's extramarital affair, which he admitted in confidence to journalists).
71. See Alter, supra note 69, at 54.
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es willing to reveal their identity." Absent strict demands from publish-
ers and editors for disclosure of confidential sources, reporters lack
incentive to aggressively seek identifiable informants when a citation to
"a senior staff official" will suffice."
Not surprisingly, confidentiality has become a valuable commodity in
our news-saturated society. ' As reporters habitually turn to anonymous
informants, some sources have begun to demand that their identities
remain secret, occasionally even before they begin to reveal informa-
tion.' Here, while the source has the ability to withhold information and
thus establish his power over the reporter, the reporter may also exer-
cise his power over the source. Journalists frequently offer anonymity as
a means of eliciting information.' This is a particularly useful resource
,72. One former reporter points out that it is much quicker to obtain a story from
a confidential source. SHAW, supra note 4, at 68. Further, a journalist takes his
chances by failing to ascertain the credibility of an anonymous source because the
source might have fabricated or distorted the truth. Alfred Knoll, Don't Quote Me,
But . . . , TiE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1988, at 4. But see DYGERT, supra note 57, at 151
(information from confidential source may eventually lead to another source who is
willing to speak on the record).
73. Some commentators believe that reporters rely heavily upon confidential sourc-
es under the mistaken belief that such sources add prestige and glamour to their
stories. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 72, at 4; SHAw, supra note 4, at 69. Norman
Isaacs, former journalist and past chairperson of the National News Council, refers to
this practice as "cloaking of sources for effect." NoRMAN E. IsAA cS, UNTENDED GATES
27, 52 (1986). This practice was decried by veteran Washington reporter James Mc-
Carthy, who suggested that the most salutory thing that could happen in his profes-
sion "would be if every reporter were required to take an oath that he would walk
out of the office of any official who insisted on talking 'off the record.'" Furthermore,
McCarthy contends that journalists should refrain from accepting "background" infor-
mation not attributable to anyone by name. Lastly, he boldly suggests that the prac-
tice of "deep background" briefings should be abolished by constitutional amendment.
Id.
74. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (journalists frequently
offer anonymity in order to gain access to news of illegal conduct). See also SHAW,
supra note 4, at 62, 66 (political tenor of Watergate crisis enabled investigative re-
porters to pursue stories without worrying about attribution); ISAACS, supra note 73,
at 49-50. Referring to pressure imposed by the "scoop, virus," one reporter claims,
"[I]f you're second often enough, they just get someone else to do your job." Id.
75. See, e.g., Garland v. Tone, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958) (actress sought to discover identity of confidential source of allegedly
defamatory news report provided by show business insider).
76. See SHAW, supra note 4, at 69. However, media critics and editors complain
that the popular use of confidential sources leads some reporters to grant confidenti-
ality for almost any story. See id. Bill Kovach, the former Washington editor of the
New York Times, recalls one reporter who told a source over the telephone, "I
when the informant is hesitant to comment or if the journalist has reason
to believe that the story will be politically sensitive." With these issues
in mind, a journalist is forced to confront three important issues prior to
reporting her story. First, she must decide whether a confidential source
serves a valid purpose in a particular story.m Next, the journalist should
determine if the use of an anonymous source is in the best interest of
the public and her profession.' Finally, the reporter must confront her
source's willingness to divulge information. A lack of cooperation on the
part of the source increases the chance that a journalist will offer some
form of an agreement or compromise to elicit valuable information.'
C. When the Judge Demands to Know "Who's Who?":
Constitutional Refuge in the Wake of Branzburg v. Hayes8
American reporters generally resist attempts to force the disclosure of
an anonymous source.' A journalist will normally reveal the identity of
a source only when compelled by a court action.' In a civil proceeding,
such as a libel suit, a court may force a reporter to reveal her source if
she is named party to the litigation." However, courts have also ordered
assume that's on background," implying that the person's identity would not be
revealed in print. Id. As a result, Kovach issued a stern warning to his staff that
confidentiality should not be volunteered, but rather granted reluctantly and only
under special circumstances., d
77. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693 (journalist agreed not to reveal names of
Black Panther party members in order to secure entry into headquarters); Alter,
supra note 69 (Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's briefings for reporters were usually
confidential).
78. Several Washington journalists confided in former reporter David Shaw that
unnamed sources are not always of critical importance and are, therefore, used too
frequently. However, these same persons asked that their identities not be revealed in
connection with those remarks. SHAW, supra note 4, at 67.
79. See generally id. at 59-60 (decreased use of anonymous sources may be means
of regaining public's trust in media).
80. In All The President's Men, their best selling book about Watergate, the famous
investigative duo of Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward noted that "without [confiden-
tial sources] there would have been no Watergate story told by the Washington
Post." BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 59, at 7.
81. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
82. See, e.g., id. at 675-76 (reporter fought subpoena compelling him to appear
before grand jury to discuss confidential source); Maine v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364, 364
(Me. 1988) (journalist refused to divulge source when called to testify at murder
trial).
83. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-76 (consolidation of four cases involving
journalists subpoenaed to testify about confidential sources); Tribune Co. v.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 1986) (reporter subpoenaed by government
official investigating alleged violations of ethics by county commissioners).
84. See, e.g., Rancho La Costa v. Penthouse, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 358-59 (Cal. Ct.
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journalists to comply with court orders when they are not named parties.
Perhaps the most common instance of forced disclosure takes place in
the criminal courts when a journalist has information regarding criminal
activity.' In this context, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he pref-
erence for anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual
criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to escape crimi-
nal prosecution,"M and that such a "preference... is hardly deserving of
constitutional protection."87 In both civil and criminal matters, journal-
ists generally claim that if courts force them to reveal the source of their
information, it will impair their newsgathering abilities because of a
source's reluctance to further cooperate.M Yet, threatened with potential
fines, unemployment, and imprisonment, even the most ardent journalists
are likely to comply with court orders.'
During an era in which even "routine" news reports are increasingly
dependent upon information provided to journalists by confidential
App. 1980) (court ordered journalist to disclose confidential source of allegedly de-
famatory article); Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 415 A.2d 683,. 685 (N.H. 1980)
(plaintiff in libel suit sought to compel identification of sources who made allegedly
defamatory statements).
85. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-76 (reporters subpoenaed by grand juries
for infonation regarding confidential sources suspected of criminal activity);
Hendricks, 14 Media L Rep. at 2372 (after obtaining information from confidential
sources about defendant's alleged criminal activity, journalists subpoenaed to testify).
But see Hqtffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723 (reversing newsman's subpoena during investi-
gation by authorities for information about confidential sources).
86. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
87. Id. The Court refused to "seriously entertain the notion that the First Amend-
ment protects a newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source,
or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do some-
thing about it." Id, at 692.
88. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679, 682 (forced disclosure of source's identity
would breed distrust between informants and the press and would hinder journalist's
newsgathering abilities); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (Ga. 1911) (compelling
disclosure of newsman's sources would substantially impair ability to report the
news).
89. One of the most publicized cases involved New York Times reporter Myron
Farber. See In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 332 (N.J. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978). Farber was sentenced to six months in jail after being held in contempt of
court. As an added penalty, his employer, the New York Times, was fined $100,000
for the reporter's refusal to cooperate with the court. The trial, in which Farber
refused to testify, ended less than three months after he was sentenced. Thus, the
reporter actually served only 82 days in jail. Id. See also Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d
464, 466 (9th Cir. 1975) (court ordered reporter jailed for refusing to reveal source of
information regarding murder), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
sources, the law has remained relatively static regarding the constitution-
al protections afforded reporters in court proceedings. The first notewor-
thy development in this area comes from Garland v. Torre,m a 1958
case involving the late actress Judy Garland. The plaintiff sought to un-
cover the identity of the source of allegedly defamatory statements."
Although the court ultimately held that the defendant journalist was
required to reveal the identity of his source, the Second Circuit suggested
for the first time that the First Amendment might provide a journalist
with a privilege to withhold a source's identity under certain circum-
stances." However, in the decade following Garland, the judicial con-
cept of First Amendment protection for journalists concealing the identi-
ty of their sources remained almost dormant. It was not until the late
1960s, when America witnessed the rise of politically dissident groups,
that courts addressed the concerns of sources and reporters alike. Orga-
nizations such as the Black Panthers began to condition the sharing of
information with the press upon the promise that their identities would
remain confidential.' Apparently, they feared that once their names
were known to the public, government forces could identify them and
subject them to prosecution for their political activities." In response,
the government sought assistance from the courts to compel disclosure
of sources possibly connected to allegedly violent and illegal activity.'
The confrontations between the media and government climaxed in
the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,' in which the Supreme Court
held that no First Amendment privilege protects the press from revealing
its confidential sources in the context of grand jury investigations under-
taken in good faith.7 While Branzburg clearly stands for the proposition
90. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
91. Id. at 547.
92. Id. at 548 (declaring that "compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential
sources of information may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some
limitation upon the availability of news"). See also In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F.
Supp. 573, 574, 577-78 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (denying newsmen privilege to refuse to
testify before grand jury about confidential sources).
93. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 679 (1972).
94. J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of the FBI, once characterized the Black Pan-
ther Party as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country . . . its mem-
bers have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have engaged in
violent confrontations with police throughout the country." S. REP. No. 755, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88 (1976). At one time, the Panthers were the focus of a covert
action program designed to disband organizations which the FBI characterized as
"Black Nationalist Hate Groups." Id. at 187.
95. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. at 577 (involving two
reporters subpoenaed to testify before grand jury investigating Black Panther Party
for acts allegedly "directed against the security of the government").
96. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
97. Id. at 690 (footnote omitted) ("We are asked to create another [testimonial
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that First Amendment protections are not absolute, the Court did recog-
nize, for the first time, that the First Amendment theoretically protects
newsgathering." However, the Court did not address the propriety of a
reporter's claiming a privilege of confidentiality when under subpoena in
a criminal proceeding.'
In spite of the indefiniteness of the majority opinion in Branzburg,
lower courts have used the case to formulate a balancing test regarding
matters not before a grand jury. In these instances courts rely on Justice
Stewart's dissent"n in which he suggests the parameters for compelling
a reporter to reveal the identity of her source.' With these parameters
in mind, courts weigh the importance of a confidentiality agreement
against the need for the court to ascertain the truth." To determine
whether a qualified privilege should protect the journalist in criminal
proceedings, a court will weigh three factors. First, the court will consid-
privilege] by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privi-
lege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.").
98. Id. at 681. The Court found that any privilege claimed by journalists must give
way to the government's fundamental interests in the administration of justice and in
solving crimes. Id. at 700-02. Modernly, federal common law provides a qualified
privilege for journalists as first recognized in Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708,
715 (3d Cir. 1979). In Riley, the Third Circuit held that journalists were privileged
not to reveal the identity of confidential sources in federal question cases due to the
strong First Amendment interest in encouraging the free flow of information. See also
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding qualified
privilege applies to criminal cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
99. The Court's opinion in Branzburg focuses upon both the confidential sources
(dissident political groups) and the crimes they allegedly committed (violent protests,
drug use). See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691-92. Therefore, the Court paid much
attention to the government's perceived interest in preventing harm to the community
instead of focusing on the nature of the relationships between the press and confi-
dential sources.
100. Id. at 725-52 (Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Zerilll v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that the
powerful dissenting opinion in Branzburg established the standards for a qualified
privilege for journalists who refuse to disclose the identities of confidential sources).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (in
deciding whether source must be disclosed, courts must strike balance between in-
terest in upholding reporter-source agreements and interests of criminal justice sys-
tem); United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reporter's privilege
must be balanced against society's interest in compelling all citizens to give relevant
testimony); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 559
F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977) (decision whether to reveal identity of confidential source
requires courts to balance reporter's interests against defendant's sixth amendment
right to a fair trial).
er whether the journalist actually possesses information vital to the reso-
lution of the ultimate issue." Second, the court must examine whether
other reasonable means of gathering the information exist.'" Last, and
perhaps most important, the court must consider whether a failure to ob-
tain the information would cause a miscarriage of justice."° Thus, under
the three Branzburg factors, a qualified privilege protects journalists
when the interests of confidentiality outweigh the need to obtain infor-
mation from a confidential source.
D. Journalists Search for Broader Protection: the Shield Laws
Branzburg's failure to establish a strict testimonial privilege spurred
the press to seek a more protective form of refuge from court orders."
As a result of intense lobbying efforts on behalf of journalists, many state
legislatures have enacted "shield laws" that provide a qualified privilege
to protect confidential communications between journalists and their
unidentified sources. 7 The shield laws are analogous to the rules of
evidence, which seek to protect confidential relationships such as those
between an attorney and client or a doctor and patient."° Today, a
slight majority of states provide varying degrees of protection for journal-
ists."u Almost half the states in this group grant an unqualified privilege
for the media, thereby enabling them to avoid revealing a source's identi-
ty in any criminal or civil proceeding."' The remaining states have cho-
103. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (compelled testi-
mony requires court to balance journalist's interests against need for testimony), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
104. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972) (uphold-
ing qualified privilege when First Amendment interest in free press outweighs interest
in forced testimony), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
105. See id.
106. The Supreme Court itself has stated that it is in effect "powerless to bar state
courts from responding in their own way and construing their own constitution so as
to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute." Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). Thus, it appears that the Court has paved the way for jour-
nalists to strengthen shield laws.
107. See generally Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Com-
mon Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 Aniz. L. REV.
815 (1983) (surveying various state approaches to shield laws). One of the most well-
known cases cited in the historical development of shield laws is that of journalist
John Peter Zenger who, in 1734, chose to remain in jail rather than reveal his sourc-
es. Zenger withstood nine months of imprisonment before he was finally tried and
acquitted. Id. at 817.
108. See Phillip R. Roach, Jr., The Newsman's Confidential Source Privilege in
Virginia, 22 U. RICH. L REV. 377, 379 (1988) (describing similarities between media
shield laws and attorney-client privilege).
109. Id. at 387-88 n.70 (listing statutes of 26 states that have enacted shield laws).
110. Id.
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sen to apply the Branzburg factors,"' thereby compelling a reporter to
identify the source if the court finds that the information sought is rele-
vant, important and not reasonably obtainable from any other source."'
Thus, the media enjoys only a qualified privilege in these states."' The
impact of shield laws on the reporter's source most effectively illustrates
the limitations of these laws."' Courts have left no doubt that the intent
of shield laws is to protect the "free flow" of information, rather than to
protect persons who provide the information."' Furthermore, in spite of
numerous proposed statutes, Congress has failed to enact a federal
shield law."' Thus, until Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,"' state shield
laws forced the press to focus on how to protect the identity of sources
from court disclosure orders rather than on whether the press had the
right to not reveal a confidential source at all."8
E. "Methinks the Source Doth Protest Too Much": Journalists Fight to
Reveal the Identity of Newsworthy Sources
Today the media has discovered that its right to shield the identity of
confidential sources can be a double-edged sword. While much of the
press enjoys the protection of shield laws,"' many of today's journalists
are seeking the right to expose the identity of a source when the source
itself is considered newsworthy." On the one hand, these journalists
argue that involuntary exposure is in the public interest."' Yet they
111. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
112. See Malcom St. Dizier, Reporters' Use of Confidential Sources, 1974 and 1984:
A Comparative Study, 6 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 44, 45 (1985).
113. See St. Dizier, supra note 112, at 45.
114. See New Jersey v. Boiardo, 416 A.2d 793, 795 (N.J. 1980) (acknowledging the
chilling effect compulsory disclosure has on confidential sources).
115. See id, (declaring that a reporter's privilege belongs exclusively to the reporter,
not her source).
116. See TOM GOLDSTEIN, THE NEWS AT ANY COST: HOW JOURNALISTS COMPROMISE
THEIR ETIcs To SHAPE THE NEWS 157-58 (1985).
117. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). The defendants in Cohen voluntarily revealed the identi-
ty of their source. Thus, the case does not squarely address the extent of protection
under shield laws. However, the Court's holding on the ability of a source to recover
for breach of a confidentiality agreement is certain to have an impact on all types of
reporter-source relationships.
118. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
July-Aug. 1988, at 24.
119. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
120. See Langley & Levine, supra note 118.
121. See, e.g., Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. But see EDMUND B. LAMBETH, COMMITTED
fight the same notion when faced with a court order compelling disclo-
sure, arguing that forcing disclosure of the source of their information
impairs their newsgathering abilities."
Revealing the identity of a confidential source is not a totally new
practice and actually occurs with greater frequency than one might sus-
pect. '" Several prominent news stories arising during the 1970s and '80s
demonstrate that such exposure is not uncommon, nor does it necessari-
ly lead to a court battle. Journalist Sidney Zion revealed to the public
that Daniel Ellsberg supplied the "Pentagon Papers" to the New York
Times."u Bob Woodward informed the press that Justice Potter Stewart
agreed to supply information for Woodward's book, The Brethren, only
on condition of anonymity."n And after the United States government
took steps to retaliate against the highiackers of the Achille Lauro cruise
ship, the public learned that none other than Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North acted as the media's confidential source."M
A related issue arises when a journalist seeks to gain a source's confi-
dence through private discussions. In these instances, the journalist may
imply or promise that he will neither use the content of the meeting nor
reveal the source of his information."' Such conversations may be nec-
essary to cultivate the trust of an informant or to gain an understanding
of information previously obtained."2 However, a problem arises when
the meeting itself produces a newsworthy story. For example, Washing-
JOURNALISM: AN ETmIc FOR THE PROFESSION 143 (1986). According to one author, the
reason for intentional exposure is commonly one of self-interest. Litigation presents
one context in which the media may reveal a source for its own benefit. This has
led some news organizations to enter into explicit contracts with sources which
provide that in the event of litigation, a source's identity may be revealed. Id. at 142-
43. See also, Richard Harwood, Defending the Indefensible, WASH. POST, June 30,
1991, at C6 (journalist decries "rhetorical whining" of editors who complain that
courts are infringing upon the right of the press to present the news).
122. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 677 (1972); HENTOFF, supra note 58, at
229-30.
123. Floyd Abrams, a well-known First Amendment attorney, has remarked that
voluntary exposure of confidential sources is especially common in defamation litiga-
tion. While journalists may give little thought to breaking a promise of confidentiality,
they may choose to "fib" about their broken promises to their peers. See Langley &
Levine, supra note 118, at 21.
124. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 156-57. Some journalists question Zion's duty
to protect Ellsburg's identity because he no longer worked for the New York Times
when he identified Ellsburg as the leak. Id,
125. See BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHEREN (1979).
126. See Two Leaks, But By Whom?, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 16. Newsweek's
decision to identify North drew criticism from the magazine's own staff as well as
from the press in general. Id
127. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 188.
128. Id.
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ton Post reporter Milton Coleman disclosed that the Reverend Jesse
Jackson referred to Jews as "Hymies" in private conversations with jour-
nalists during the 1984 presidential campaign." A similar incident arose
when Henry Cisneros, then mayor of San Antonio, Texas, confessed to a
local reporter that he had engaged in an extramarrital affair with a cam-
paign aide." ° Shortly thereafter, the San Antonio Express-News pub-
lished the story.3' While both of these incidents took place under a
cloak of confidentiality, the respective newspapers rationalized the deci-
sion to publish the information by claiming that the stories were a matter
of public importance."in This defense exposes the vulnerability of a
source who trusts the express or implied promise of a reporter. If the
journalist is given the freedom to determine when public interest con-
cerns justify publication, it appears that the journalist may disclose al-
most anything that the media deems newsworthy.
F. Ethical Guidelines for the Confidential Source Dilemma
Since 1923, codes of ethics addressing a wide variety of issues have
provided guidelines for American journalists in their newsgathering
tasks."n Two primary problems remain regarding confidential sources.
First, the media industry has generally avoided implementing strict stan-
dards with the "teeth" necessary to effectively restrain reporters in cer-
tain situations. Most newspapers consider it sufficient to abide by the
policies of national professional organizations such as the American
Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE).' News outlets that choose to
adopt their own ethical codes compound this problem." Quite often,
129. See id'. at 187-88 (illustrating need for media and its sources to clarify the
terms of their conversations).
130. See David Maraniss, The Tumult of Mayor Cisneros, WASH. POST., Oct. 24,
1988, at Cl.
131. See SABATO, supra note 66, at 17-18.
132. Editors believed that as a candidate for the nation's highest office, Jackson
could not hide behind a guise of confidentiality. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 187.
Likewise, those involved in the decision to publish news of Cisneros' affair deter-
mined that the citizens of San Antonio needed a complete and honest account of
their leader's marital problems. See Maraniss, supra note 130, at Cl.
133. The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) set forth their Ethical
Code in 1923. Some 50 years later, the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ)
implemented their own code. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 166.
134. See id at 167.
135. Id. Goldstein's research revealed that 27 of 37 newspapers had their own
written codes. Id.
their written standards are no more strict or precise-than those of the
national organizations." Second, whether applying a national or local
code, journalists have little guidance regarding the issue of confidential
sources.' However, in the aftermath of Janet Cooke's revelation of her
fabricated story of the child heroin addict, some newspapers began to
reexamine their policies during the 1980s."
The common thread among most of these new policies is the greater
role played by editors in the decision-making process. Prior to granting
confidentiality to a source, journalists generally must obtain permission
from their editor." This includes revealing the source's identity so that
the editor may evaluate that source's credibility.4 ' Editors justify this
expanded influence by citing the legal ramifications for the newspaper
should a source seek redress.4 ' They argue that if the newspaper must
face liability for its stories, the paper deserves some measure of control
over the actions of its reporters.'" As one might expect, media com-
mentators have not greeted this policy with enthusiasm, nor allowed it to
escape criticism. Both journalists and media commentators complain that
by leaving the ultimate decision of disclosure to an editor, the system
strips the journalist of his independence.'" Furthermore, they contend
that this system presents logistical problems for the reporter, who is out
in the field covering a story while his editor remains in the news-
room.'" In addition, many editors fear that increased regulatory proce-
dures will provide fuel for a plaintiff's claim in court.'4" Others argue,
however, that a plaintiff may use a failure to legislate media ethics
against a journalist in the courtroom." Common logic dictates that it is
136. Id,
137. Industry-wide codes are generally grouped under broad categories, none of
which includes reference to confidential sources. See infra notes 434-36 and accom-
panying text.
138. See generally, GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 217 (urging stricter and more
definitive guidelines for the reporter-source relationship).
139. Langley & Levine, supra note 118, at 22 (referring to several news outlets
where editors are required to examine and approve of reporter-source agreements of
confidentiality).
140. See, e.g., Cohen V, 111 S. Ct 2513, 2515 (1991).
141. See, e.g., Langley & Levine, supra note 118, at 22 (some insurers offering
coverage in the event of a libel suit demand to know the identity of sources).
142. Id.
143. See Richard P. Cunningham, Should Reporters Reveal Sources to Editors?, THE
QUILL, Oct. 1988, at 7-8 (emphasizing that the independent nature of jounmalists tends
to breed resentment toward policies designed to curb their freedom).
144. lId
145. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at '166-67 (citing belief that a paper trail of
ethical codes may substantially influence juries in libel litigation). But see id at 167
(declaring that the threat that a newsroom's ethical guidelines will have adverse im-
pact in litigation is exaggerated).
146. See, e.g., Seegmiller v. KSL Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 976 (Utah 1981) (finding the
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more prudent to avoid liability by implementing practical guidelines be-
fore a disgruntled source decides to file a claim.'
III. CURRENT APPROACHES AND RECENT CASE LAW
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOURCE RECOVERY
The issue of whether a court should enforce a reporter's promise of
confidentiality to a news source sparks a classic conflict between two
important freedoms. On the one hand, the First Amendment affords the
press broad liberties in the gathering and publication of n~wsworthy
information. On the other hand, the freedom to contract, while not a
constitutionally protected right," is one in which the state also has an
important interest. Perhaps the most obvious method of resolving this
dilemma would be to recognize that interests of a constitutional dimen-
sion clearly outweigh those founded in the common law of contracts.
This approach, however, ignores the principle that even constitutional
rights must be reconciled with other rights, not simply through their
inherent power as tenets of the Constitution, but in a manner which rec-
ognizes the broad interests of society as a whole."'
Courts continue to search for the means by which to resolve the con-
flicting interests of First Amendment and contract freedoms. Indeed, as
contract actions by sources are finding their way into courtrooms, this is-
sue has become the subject of heated judicial debate and scholarly criti-
cism."W Part A of this section describes three popular approaches to
this issue: the traditional contract model; the promissory estoppel model;
and the First Amendment model. Part B Mustrates how various state and
federal courts have treated each approach, as well as the United States
Supreme Court, which squarely addressed the issue of source recovery
for breach of a confidentiality agreement in the 1991 case, Cohen v.
customs and practices of media defendants relevant in determining negligence).
147. In fact, many news outlets update their written standards of conduct in an
attempt to curb abuses by reporters. ISAACS, supra note 73, at 53.
148. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (declaring that
not all impairments of private contracts are deemend unconstitutional in spite of
protections afforded by Contracts Clause). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
149. See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L REv. 1, 39 (1943).
150. See, e.g., Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (finding that law of promissory es-
toppel governs source's claim against media defendant); Ruzicka v. Condd Nast Publi-
cations, Inc., 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding state law does not enforce promis-
es of confidentiality).
Cowles Media Co. "
A. Legal Models for Treatment of the Reporter-Source Relationship
1. Strict Liability Under Contract Law: Is a Promise Always
a Promise?
While some would argue that reporter-source agreements are promises
which merely create ethical obligations as opposed to contracts,"
courts decline to make such a distinction.'" Under this approach, the
principle of strict liability demands that, absent a valid defense, such as
misrepresentation, mistake, incapacity, or duress, the agreement should
be considered an enforceable contract."M Accordingly, parties entering
into an agreement do so with a reasonable expectation of full, or at least
substantial, performance. Thus, under the "sanctity of contracts" ap-
proach, it follows that a source who enters into a confidentiality agree-
ment would likely recover damages for losses flowing from a journalist's
breach of contract by revealing the source's identity.'" Proponents of
this theory point to several policies which justify an important state in-
terest in upholding traditional notions of contract law, most importantly
reliance,'" efficiency, 6 ' fairness,'" and primacy of will. " With
these policies in mind, some would argue that enforcement of reporter-
source relationships is necessary regardless of the actual substance of a
confidentiality agreement."w
The neutral application of contract law to agreements between private
parties might suggest an absence of state action for purposes of First
Amendment scrutiny.' As one commentator aptly noted, "This ap-
151. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (emphasizing that First Amendment does not
protect press from suit arising from breach of reporter-source agreement).
152. See supra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Cohen IIl, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The Minnesota
Court of Appeals clearly found the existence of an offer, acceptance, and consider-
ation in the agreement between Cohen and the newspapers. Id. at 258-59.
154. See JOHN D. CAL&MARI & JOSEPH M. PERIJO, CONTRACTS § 9-1 (3d ed. 1987).
155. See id. at § 1-4. For centuries, legal philosophers have focused on the follow-
ing five factors to explain why the legal system recognizes and enforces private
agreements: "(a) [T]he human will either as a source of sovereignty or (b) as a
source of moral compulsion, (c) private autonomy, (d) reliance, and (e) the needs of
trade." Id.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
157. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.3 (4th ed. 1992).
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
159. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HAv. L REv. 553, 575 (1933).
160. See GRANT GaIMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 40 (1974) (stating that freedom
of contract is a fundamental tenet of contract law).
161. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2517-18 (1991) (finding that the First Amendment
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proach is neither adequate in its denial of state action nor faithful to the
body of contract law which it purports to apply.""I Since its historic
ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court has
found that the test of state action is "not the form in which state power
has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised. " " Therefore, a finding of state action in the context of
a dispute involving a reporter-source confidentiality agreement is merely
an extension of the "unambiguous assumption of state action in the con-
text of tort claims, in which courts enforcing the common law would be
adjudicating state-created rights and duties.""
Aside from issues arising out of the state action dispute, there are
other reasons why the contract, model represents an overly simplistic
approach to reporter-source agreements. Even if journalists should be
bound by their promises of confidentiality just like other parties to pri-
vate agreements, even classic contract doctrine recognizes that in some
instances, public policy interests may override those of the contracting
parties. For example, the doctrines of unconscionability, mistake, frustra-
does not require that courts more strictly scrutinize enforcement of the theory of
promissory estoppel against the press than enforcement against others).
162. See Levi, supra note 3, at 64546.
163. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
164. Id, at 265.
165. Levi, supra note 3, at 647. Professor Levi suggests that those who would
assign contract law to the realm of purely private interests might also contend that
the fundamental principles of tort and contract do not demand equal scrutiny by the
state. However, over time, rigid distinctions between contract and tort have begun to
give way to a partial merger of these two areas of the law. As Professor Tribe has
remarked, "In an era in which contract and tort merge ... [a] distinction is hardly
satisfactory." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1714 (2d ed. 1988).
For example, the premise that parties are free to contract as they desire founds the
traditional tenets of contract law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 8, intro-
ductory note (1979). Accordingly, parties to a voluntary agreement are generally
responsible for the consequences of their acts. See id. However, there are recognized
exceptions to this doctrine which suggest that social values play a substantive role in
the enforcement of contracts, just as they do in tort law. According to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, under some circumstances "the interest in freedom of
contract is outweighed by some overriding interest of society." Id. For example, the
doctrines of unconscionability, undue influence, mistake, frustration, and incapacity
limit the enforcement of a private voluntary contract. Id. at §§ 152-53, 177, 262, 265.
See also id. at § 161(b) (stating that parties are obligated to act with one another in
good faith and with proper deference to reasonable standards of conduct); id, at §
164 (noting that misrepresentations render a contract voidable); id. at § 178 (stating
that courts many deny enforcement of illegal agreements and others contracts deter-
mined to be contrary to public policy).
tion, duress, and undue influence may limit the enforcement of private
contracts."6 In the words of one commentator, these limitations serve
as "self-consciously public supplements to a dominantly private contract
doctrine, by policing the limits of acceptable bargain in the name of so-
cial norms of fairness."6 ' Thus, it follows that prior to the strict en-
forcement of any private agreement, courts must examine the overall
social worth of the contract as well as any special interests of the con-
tracting parties.'
Granted, courts generally enforce agreements of confidentiality arising
in the context of traditional business relationships on the grounds that
they involve certain fiduciary duties or that enforcement will promote
classic commercial interests such as investment and business morali-
ty." However meritorious the automatic enforcement of contracts may
be in the workplace, extending this principle to press confidentiality
agreements is short-sighted and certainly dangerous to reporter-source
relationships. Breaching a promise of confidentiality should not go un-
punished. However, at a minimum, courts should consider imposing a
higher burden of proof in this context, requiring a plaintiff suing under a
strict contract theory to show, with clear and convincing evidence, that
the reporter either promised confidentiality with the knowledge that she
would later breach the promise, or with serious doubts as to whether
she would honor the promise.7 Any lesser protection afforded the
press fails to recognize the historic importance of the media's
newsgathering and publication functions.
2. Promissory Estoppel: Public Policy Offers Sources a Second
Chance for Recovery Under Contract Law
Even if the typical reporter-source agreement fails to meet the require-
ments of a valid contract,' a source may have an alternate means of
recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel
is viewed as both a method of protecting the promisee's reliance interest
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152-53, 177, 265 (1979).
167. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1001 (1985).
168. Id.
169. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV.
350, 363-70 (1989) (noting that courts presume various societal interests in the pro-
motion of confidential relationships).
170. See Michael Dicke, Comment, Promises and the Press: First Amendment
Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73
MINN. L REv. 1553, 1579-81 (1989) (proposing clear and convincing standard for proof
that "a confidentiality agreement existed and that a media entity breached the
agreement by publishing information in violation of its terms").
171. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
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and as a means of giving effect to the parties' real intentions upon enter-
ing into a legally binding agreement." While generally considered an
extension of the law of contracts, promissory estoppel departs from the
fundamentals of contracts in two important respects. First, the doctrine
rejects the notion that all voluntary agreements (subject to narrow ex-
ceptions) should be enforced, because promissory estoppel represents
what the parties necessarily intended." Second, the doctrine applies a
contextual approach to contracts, paying particular attention to the pub-
lic policy implications of contract enforcement.74 With these principles
in mind, the factfinder must ultimately determine whether "irjustice"
would result if the agreement at issue were not enforced.'"
While reporter-source agreements are generally presumed to impose an
ethical duty to keep the identity of a source secret, the legal ramifica-
tions of a reporter's promise are subject to various interpretations."6
Therefore, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the court first ex-
amines whether the parties intended legal consequences to flow from
their agreement. While some would argue that an exchange of promises
necessarily implies a legal contract,'" there may be instances in which
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). See generally Randy E.
Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formali-
ties, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L REv. 443 (1987).
173. See, e.g., Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990) (finding that the parties
to a reporter-source agreement of confidentiality did not intend legal consequences to
flow from their promises).
174. See i. (declaring contract law "ill fit" in the context of press-source rela-
tionships).
175. See Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05.
176. See Lou CANNON, REPORTING: AN INSIDE VIEW, 247-53 (1977). Recognizing the
confusion that sometimes results when insiders are consulted for background informa-
tion, one journalist has suggested seven different options designed to alleviate the
uncertain consequences of background briefings:
1. Completely on the record, everything fully quotable.
2. On the record, but check quotes with interviewee before using.
3. On the record, but paraphrase or indirect discourse only.
4. Background with direct quotes attributable to a source such as a White
House official.
5. Background with indirect quotes attributable to a source such as a White
House official.
6. Deep background, no quotes, use with attribution such as it is understood
or without attribution and "on your own"
7. Off the record, information not publishable.
Id. at 247-48.
177. See Kurt Hirsch, Note, Throwing the Book at Revelations: First Amendment
the ground rules established by the reporter or source are so vague or
ambiguous that one or both parties presume the other to lack serious
intentions. Thus, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, courts
will refuse to create a contract in situations in which, given the social
and professional context, the parties were not likely to expect legal con-
sequences to flow from their agreement."
The second step of a promissory estoppel analysis requires the court
to determine whether, given the "special relationship" of the a reporter
and his source,"8 non-enforcement of an agreement would result in in-
justice. Thus, the court must weigh the First Amendment concerns of a
free press against the state's interest in upholding the terms of a valid
contract.' While classic constitutional balancing tests" generally tip
the scale in favor of the freedom afforded the press under the First
Amendment, this is not necessarily the case when it comes to an agree-
ment of confidentiality." In contrast to law of defamation, the doctrine
of promissory estoppel involves a less mechanical approach" in which
Implications of Enforcing Reporters' Promises, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 161,
178 (1990-91) (declaring that the parties in Cohen certainly intended to create a
contract). But see Levi supra note 3, at 667 (hypothesizing that the parties in Cohen
might have misunderstood one another's expectations).
178. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 187-88 (context of reporter's conversation
with a politician illustrates need for parties to clarify terms of their conversations).
179. See, e.g., Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (1990).
180. The Minnesota Supreme Court analogized the reporter-source relationship to
other "special relationship" settings in which non-enforcement of a contract is found
not to upset fundamental considerations of public policy. Id. Indeed, not all confiden-
tial relationships warrant protection under the law. Courts recognize that relationships
necessarily involve an element of risk. As one court has commented, "A cause of
action cannot lie each time someone succumbs to the temptation to break a confi-
dence and whisper a juicy rumor." Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6 Hauppauge,
324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 228 (Dist. Ct. 1971). For example, in the case of a broken engage-
ment, the law defers to society's interest in enforcing traditional notions of morality
and personal honor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21(c), illus. 5 (1981).
This standard is appropriate in the area of social relations where an individual should
be to free to conduct himself as he sees fit, subject to reasonable limits. Further-
more, personal taste and instinct typically play a large role in the area of personal
relations. Therefore, it follows that individuals are better able to make well-reasoned
decisions than courts of law.
181. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990).
182. For example, a decision to impose limits on the press requires a court to first
consider whether the state has a compelling state interest in regulating the activity.
Second, the court must determine whether the proposed limitations substantially
relate to that interest. See, e.g., Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media L Rep.
(BNA) 2417, 2420 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1981) (describing terms of appropriate balancing
test). See also Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 778 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
183. See, e.g., Cohen V, 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518-19 (holding that First Amendment inter-
ests do not shelter the press from uniform application of promissory estoppel doc-
trine).
184. Although subsequent cases have established that the press is not completely
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the potentially high costs of non-enforcement command heightened pro-
tection of the interests of both media defendants and sources."s Since
policy considerations involve difficult value choices, courts may be reluc-
tant to explicitly set forth the reasons for their decision under the sec-
ond step of the promissory estoppel model, choosing instead to focus on
the first issue-the intent of the parties."s But regardless of whether
courts base their opinions on the first or second step of a promissory
estoppel model, promises made by the press "in the classic First Amend-
ment context of... a political campaign""7 do not always enjoy the
same protection as other forms of free speech. While promissory estop-
pel permits some degree of flexibility in an otherwise rigid contractual
analysis of reporter-source agreements, all critics of the contract model
do not welcome these accommodations."M
3. First Amendment Protection: Heightened Scrutiny Shelters the
Press
You can't tell a carpenter he is free to practice his trade as long as he uses no
tools. You can't tell a newspaperman that he has a free press as long as he does
not use his tools. .... "
Some would suggest that traditional notions of a free press impose an
shielded from liability under defamation law, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) and its progeny imposed heightened protection for the press against
suits for libel and slander by requiring that public officials and public figure plaintiffs
prove that defamatory statements were made with "actual malice" (i.e., with knowl-
edge that the statements were false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity).
See id, 376 U.S. at 279-80. See also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
185. In Coken IV, 457 N.W.2d 199 (1990), the Minnesota Supreme Court found in
favor of the Star Tribune and Pioneer Press. Id. at 205. However, the court conced-
ed that "[tihere may be instances where a confidential source would be entitled to a
remedy such as promissory estoppel, when the state's interest in enforcing the prom-
ise to the source outweighs First Amendment considerations . . . ." Id. Here, the
court recognized that the Constitution does not protect the press from considerations
of public policy. Indeed, the majority's use of terms such as "inappropriate" and "ill
fit" in reference to contract law to some degree demonstrates its own policy con-
cerns. See id. at 203.
186, As Professor Levi astutely commented, the Minnesota Supreme Court "at-
tempted to disguise its policy determination by shoehorning it into the apparently
doctrinal rubric of the parties' intent .. " Levi, supra note 3, at 614.
187. Id, at 205.
188. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
189. CANNON, supra note 176, at 284 (quoting A.M. Rosenthal, former managing
editor of the New York Times).
impenetrable barrier between the press and a source whose identity has
been unwillingly revealed." However, the First Amendment freedoms
to gather and print the news do not exempt the press from tort
claims.' As one commentator has aptly noted, courts do not tolerate
illegal conduct merely because it expresses a constitutionally protected
idea ."
While journalists have sought to expand their general First Amendment
privileges, they have failed to convince the Supreme Court that sources
are prevented from pursuing damages for a breach of a confidentiality
agreement." In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme
Court afforded broad protection to the press in instances where publica-
tion involved lawfully obtained, truthful information."5 In the words of
the Court, "absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order,"
the press remains immune from a claim of civil damages.' While some
may view Smith as a general expansion of the First Amendment's protec-
tion, an equally well-established line of cases demonstrates that even if
generally applicable laws, such as the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
affect the ability of the press to gather and report the news, these laws
do not offend constitutional principles."7
When determining whether government regulations impose upon the
media's First Amendment rights, courts employ a two-step "ends/means"
analysis." First, the court must decide whether a compelling state in-
terest justifies limiting the media's access to the news."' Second, the
190. See, e.g., Cohen V, 111 S. Ct., 2513 2519-21 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(finding that use of promissory estoppel claim in context of political campaign vio-
lates First Amendment). But see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 116, at 193 (characterizing
fears about court-imposed threats to the First Amendment cited by Court in Sullivan
as exaggerated).
191. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, the press has not enjoyed abso-
lute protection from either criminal or civil claims. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972). See, e.g., Galella v. Onassiss, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973)
(newsgathering privilege does not provide immunity from laws broken while covering
a story); Prahle v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (Constitution
does not confer right for reporter to trespass); Belluomo v. KAKE, 596 P.2d 832, 835-
36 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (television station not protected from claim of trespass in
pursuit of news story).
192. BERNARD KAUFMAN, THE MESSAGE, THE MEDIUM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19
(1970).
193. See, e.g., Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2519 ("The First Amendment does not grant
the press such limitless protection.").
194. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
195. Id at 105-06.
196. Id. at 103.
197. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2518.
198. See, e.g., Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
199. See id.
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court examines whether the regulation of the particular news activity
substantially relates to that interest.'s Although this test serves a useful
purpose in the area of government regulation, civil enforcement of a
confidentiality agreement cannot be properly termed a "government act"
that imperrmissibly limits newsgathering. Moreover, application of the test
by analogy falls because it does not take into account public policy con-
cerns stemming from the failure to enforce a valid agreement between
two consenting parties."0 Granted, the absence of a First Amendment
privilege from contract claims may impose additional restraints on press
freedom, but these limitations are indeed justified. While journalists play
an undeniably critical role in the dissemination of vital public informa-
tion, their status does not exempt them from fundamental responsibili-
ties mandated by an orderly society.'
At least one court has suggested a First Amendment approach to confi-
dentiality agreements modeled after the "actual malice" standard estab-
lished in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' By implementing the
Sullivan standard, courts would focus almost exclusively on the media
defendant's state of mind.' In contrast to the strict contract approach,
one might assume that the application of the Sullivan standard to re-
porter-source agreements would not only offer increased protection of
the state's interests in the reporting of newsworthy information, but
would spur robust political debate. However, it does not fortify the barri-
er between the media and civil claimants, nor does it provide a workable
alternative to the contract or promissory estoppel models.' It is impor-
tant to note that courts would apply the reckless disregard standard to
200. See i. at 257.
201. See inja text accompanying notes 319-21.
202. The First Amendment itself sets forth certain responsibilities along with the
rights afforded the press. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967) (First
Amendment does not absolve press from liability for publication of calculated false-
hoods); Bavarian Motor Works Ltd. v. Manchester, 305 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (N.Y. 1969)
(inseparable from privilege of free speech is responsibility not to abuse this freedom).
203. See-Fries v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 456687 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1982) (sug-
gesting that communication privilege afforded by state tort law would serve as a
check on claim of damages in source's contract claim).
204. According to SuUivan and its progeny, the "actual malice" standard requires a
showing that the media defendant made defamatory statements with the knowledge
that they were false, or with "reckless disregard" of their falsity, in cases in which
the plaintiff is a public official or public figure. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-30 (1964). See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
205. For a full discussion of the flaws of the defamation privilege when applied to
confidentiality cases, see Levi, supra note 3, at 658-65.
situations where the publication at issue is truthful." As the source
need not prove the falsity of the information disclosed, a claim of reck-
less disregard must focus on the media defendant's decision to publish
the source's name. When the source agrees to furnish information based
on a promise of confidentiality, it follows that any willful decision to
reveal a source's identity involves reckless disregard for the source's
expectation of privacy. 7 Therefore, the transfer of the Sullivan stan-
dard to confidentiality cases affords the plaintiff a tremendous windfall
and thereby weakens the media's protection from civil suits.
Moreover, the defamation standard, expressly formulated to minimize
the potential chilling effects of restraints on the press,' could conceiv-
ably instigate a new chill on reporter-source agreements in one of two
ways. First, if courts were to construe the reckless disregard standard as
affording heightened protection for a media defendant, it would likely
lead to self-censorship on the part of reluctant sources. Second, fear-
ing the possibility that increased protection might lead reporters to
breach confidentiality agreements more frequently, sources would be
reluctant to share their news, thereby decreasing the amount of informa-
tion available to the press and the public."' On the other hand, if the
court found the reckless disregard standard to increase the chances of
recovery for a source, reporters might hesitate to extend offers of con-
fidentiality."' While the chilling effects of a defamation standard are
speculative at best, they nevertheless cast further doubt on the applica-
206. Unlike defamation cases, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for the publica-
tion of false information, a claim for the breach of a confidentiality agreement re-
quires publication of the source's name or perhaps facts sufficient to establish his
identity. While courts have yet to find a breach of contract under the latter scenario,
with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cohen, source recovery remains a dis-
tinct possibility. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Ruzicka v. Cond6 Nast Publica-
tions, Inc., 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991) (although backgroud information made source
identifiable to several persons, state law barred cause of action for breach of con-
tract).
207. In the words of one commentator:
[W]hat does it mean to ask whether the press showed reckless disregard of
the consequences of disclosure? Given that confidentiality is always requested
self-protectively and that reporters inevitably know of some potentially
harmful effect to the source of being identified, it is difficult to discern how
voluntary disclosure by the press would not virtually always rise to the level
of reckless disregard.
Levi, supra note 3, at 660.
208. Any substantial chilling effect on the freedoms secured by the First Amend-
ment triggers constitutional protection. See Thomas 1. Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALWF. L. REV. 422, 441 (1980).
209. See Levi, supra note 3, at 662.
210. See id.
211. Id,
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tion of First Amendment tort law to the subject of confidentiality agree-
ments.
The First Amendment is not wholly irrelevant to an analysis of report-
er-source agreements. Indeed, the risk to First Amendment freedoms
created by a strict contract approach demonstrates the need to consider
the costs to the press if such agreements are strictly enforced. However,
any model which attempts to increase protection for the press cannot
ignore other relevant social policies. Otherwise, First Amendment free-
doms might preclude recovery for a source who justifiably relied on an
unqualified and unambiguous promise of confidentiality.
B. Recent Cases Illustrating the Tensions Between the First
Amendment and Contract Law
While source confidentiality agreements have remained a topic of heat-
ed debate among journalists and media watchdog groups alike, sources
whose identities journalists have revealed are moving beyond the realm
of philosophical discussion by seeking legal redress. This Section will
address three cases,"2 each arising from an attempt to enforce a confi-
dentiality agreement, which raise the issue of how courts should treat
the disclosure of a source's identity. Two of the cases squarely address
the subject of news leaks and offer very distinct analyses of the ramifica-
tions of the reporter-source relationship. The facts of the third case pro-
vide a variation of the classic news leak scenario and illustrate one of
the different approaches a court could take when addressing a breach of
a reporter-source agreement. This section will discuss the various fact
patterns presented in each case with an emphasis on the distinct types of
agreements formed by the sources and their media counterparts.
1. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
a. Introduction
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.," 3 a sharply divided Supreme Court
squarely addressed the issue of a journalist's obligation to honor his
promise of confidentiality to a source. Daniel Cohen sued Minnesota's
212. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Ruzicka v. Cond6 Nast Publications, Inc., 939
F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991); Fries v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 456687 (Super. Ct.
Cal. 1982).
213. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513.
two largest newspapers, the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch (Pioneer
Press) and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune (Star Tribune), alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract after the two news-
papers published stories identifying Cohen as the source of information
about a candidate for lieutenant governor."' Several days before the
1982 election, Cohen contacted Lori Sturdevant from the Star Tribune
and Bill Salisbury from the Pioneer Press and offered to provide
embarassing information from court records concerning Democrat-Farm-
Labor (Democratic)"5 candidate Marlene Johnson.2 "0 At the time,
Cohen was an active participant in the campaign of the Independent-
Republican (Republican) party's gubernatorial nominee, Wheelock Whit-
ney."' The records revealed that in 1969 Johnson had been charged
with three counts of unlawful assembly and was convicted of petty theft
in the following year."8 The charges for unlawful assembly were later
dropped, and Johnson's conviction was vacated in 1971.1
On October 27, 1982, less than a week before Minnesota voters would
head to the polls, Cohen separately approached the reporters, and in so
many words, made the following offer:
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candidate in the upcom-
ing election, and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is that I will
be treated as an anonymous source, that my name will not appear in any material
in connection with this, and you will also agree that you're not going to pursue
with me a question of who my source is, then I'll furnish you with the docu-
ments.m
214. Id.
215. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. 1990). The Democratic-Farm-Labor Party
of Minnesota is affiliated with the national Democratic party. Likewise, the state's In-
dependent-Republican party is a subdivision of the national Republican party.
216. It was Gary Flanke, a former Independent-Republican legislator and county
attorney, and not Cohen, who originally uncoverered the information about the Demo-
cratic-Farm-Labor candidate for lieutenant governor. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248, 252
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
217. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
218. Id.
219. Id. Both newspapers offered Johnson the opportunity to explain the court
records. She contended that the unlawful assembly charges stemmed from her partici-
pation in a protest against allegedly discriminatory hiring practices on municipal
construction projects. The petty theft conviction arose out of Johnson's departure
from a store after failing to pay for six dollars' worth of sewing materials. Apparently
the incident occurred during a period when Johnson suffered from emotional distress.
Ild.
220. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 200. See also Maureen Rubin, Rethinking the Anony-
mous Source Dilemma, PuB. REL J.,. Nov. 30, 1988, at 12. Immediately after the court
records were obtained, several supporters of the Independent-Republican party met
and determined that Cohen should be the one to release the documents to the local
media while retaining his anonymity. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 252.
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With the election only days away, reporter Lori Sturdevant of the Star
Tribune found the offer too good to refuse and accepted the documents
subject to Cohen's four conditions."
Neither party to the suit disputed the reporter's promise or that the
condition of anonymity was essential to Cohen's decision to transfer the
court records to Sturdevant. However, editors at the Star Tribune
claimed that they realized that the identity of the source was newswor-
thy only after the transaction between Cohen and the journalist took
place.'m After much internal debate, the Star Tribune published a story
identifying Cohen as the source of the records.m The editorial staff rea-
soned that the public deserved to know that a member of the Republican
campaign attempted a last-minute sabotage of the Democratic candi-
date.2  Furthermore, failure to disclose Cohen's identity might lead to
suspicion of innocent parties, and other news agencies would likely re-
veal Cohen's name anyway.' The editorial staff at the Pioneer Press
reached a' similar conclusion and independently decided to publish
Cohen's identity."
On the day that the articles naming him as the source appeared, Cohen
was fired from his position with a Minneapolis advertising agency.'f He
promptly sued the newspapers, claiming breach of contract and misrep-
resentation. The jury ruled for Cohen on both counts and awarded him
$200,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages. 9 In an un-
221. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2515.
222. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 204.
223. See id at 202.
224. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. In post-trial motions, the defense alleged that edi-
tors "grew concerned because . . . 'the identity of the source was as newsworthy as
the underlying, facts.'" Rubin, supra note 220, at 12. Furthermore, "the editors thought
the public had a right to know that someone close to the Whitney campaign 'was
attempting to carry out last-minute, political dirty tricks.'" Id.
225. Cohen 111, 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
226. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. 1990). For this reason, the editors re-
frained from describing their source as a Whitney supporter, a member of the Whit-
ney campaign, or a prominent member of the Republican party. Cohen III, 445
N.W.2d at 253.
227. Rubin, supra note 220, at 12. The Star Tribune had previously endorsed the
Perpich/Johnson ticket, which caused concern among editors that non-disclosure
might be construed as a cover-up. Id,
228. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. Several more items concerning Cohen's role as a
source appeared in the press shortly after he was fired, including an opinion piece
criticizing him for his self-righteousness and an editorial cartoon depicting his actions
as "last minute campaign smears." Cohen I, 445 N.W.2d at 254.
229. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. "In denying the newspapers pre-trial motions for
precedented ruling, the court of appeals upheld the contract claim after
determining that Cohen and the newspapers had reached a mutual agree-
ment by the traditional means of an offer and acceptance in exchange
for valuable consideration.' The court found that the newspapers
breached the contract when they broke their respective promises, there-
by failing to perform once performance by the other party was com-
plete
1
Next, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the First
Amendment barred Cohen's breach of contract claim because the disclo-
sure of Cohen's name was both truthful and newsworthy." The court
concluded that First Amendment interests did not bar a claim for breach
of contract for three reasons. First, Cohen's case lacked state action in
order to trigger First Amendment analysis.' Second, the government's
interest in upholding contractual obligations sufficiently outweighed
alleged First Amendment interests.2 And finally, the newspapers
dismissal, Minnesota District Court Judge Franklin J. Knoll wrote, 'This court can per-
ceive no constitutional dimension in the case at bar. This is not a case about free
speech, rather it is one about contracts and misrepresentations.'" Rubin, supra note
220, at 14.
230. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 258-59. The terms of the contract may be interpreted
as follows:
Cohen: I'll give you my tantalizing news story if you promise not to reveal
my identity.
Paper. Terrific. We accept and agree not to publish your name in connection
with this story if you promise to provide the details.
Thus, the parties formed an oral contract and each provided valuable consideration:
Cohen provided a juicy story and the newspapers promised him confidentiality. See
Cohen V, 111 S.Ct. at 2515-16.
The statute of frauds did not provide a defense for the press in this case because
the contract was to be fully performed within one year. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 259.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 254-58. While upholding the contract claim, the court of appeals eliminat-
ed the punitive damages award. Id. at 260.
233. Id. at 254-56. The court reasoned that since "[tjhe [F]irst [A]mendment bars
only government action that restricts free speech or press freedom" and "the neutral
application of state laws, is not state action," it follows that the First Amendment is
not at issue when the court merely seeks-to apply the neutral principles of contract
law, irrespective of the particular context in which the claim arose. Id at 254-55.
The court distinguished Cohen's contract claim from those Supreme Court cases
that have found the application of defamation law to constitute state action. Id. at
255 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The court reasoned
that defamation law "inherently limits the content of speech" by "sanctioning the
speech itself." Id. Conversely, in the formation of a contract, "[t]he parties themselves
[select] the speech or conduct they wish [ ] to be the subject matter of the con-
tract." Id. at 255-56. Therefore, the object of the sanctions is the breach of contract,
not the words contained therein.
234. The court of appeals applied a traditional balancing test to determine whether
the source's interest in receiving civil damages for the alleged breach of confiden-
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waived their First Amendment rights when they became parties to the
contract. 6
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached quite a different conclusion. In
a four to two decision, the court held that a cause of action for breach
of contract would not lie against the newspapers and reversed the lower
court's judgment.'s The court reasoned that absent an actual contract,
Cohen was entitled to recovery only if the enforcement of the reporter's
promise was necessary to avoid an injustice."l Although the newspa-
pers arguably had an ethical duty to maintain the secrecy of the source's
identity, this did not necessarily imply a legal duty.'s The majority pre-
sented two theories as the means for justifying non-enforcement of the
agreement. First, in situations where the parties do not intend a contract,
the law will not create one.' Second, when other types of contracts
concerning special relationships are before the courts, they will not be
enforced in a manner inconsistent with public policy considerations.'
tiality outweighed the interests of a free press. Id at 256 (citations omitted). Holding
steadfastly to the proposition that, in general, the media is obliged to follow the law,
the court held that the contract interest prevailed in this case. Id. The court found
that the protection of Cohen's contractual rights was a "compelling" state interest Id.
In contrast, the newspapers' interest in publishing Cohen's identity-admittedly news-
worthy information-was accorded little weight Id. at 256-58.
235. Id. at 258. In addressing this final issue, the court carefully explained that a
constitutional right can only be waived in clear and compelling circumstances. Id. In
this case, the court of appeals found that the newspapers had indeed waived their
First Amendment right to publish Cohen's name under the clear and compelling stan-
dard. The reporters knowingly and voluntarily pledged confidentiality, thereby waiving
any constitutional right to disclose the confidential information. Id.
236. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 203-05 (Minn. 1989). The court's conclusion was
surprising in light of its acknowledgement that the transaction between Cohen and
the reporters was indeed an exchange of promises. Further, the court recognized that
that this type of behavior generally forms the basis of an enforceable contract. Fi-
nally, the court went so far as to state that the three basic elements of a con-
tract--offer, acceptance, and consideration-were seemingly present. Id at 202.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 203.
239. Id. This is perhaps the most unpersuasive portion of the Minnesota Supreme
Court's ruling. The court would not have the law create a contract even though the
parties to the agreement never denied the exchange of mutual promises. See supra
note 230 and accompanying text. The exchange of promises is the very heart of a
contractual relationship and demands full enforcement.
240. The court analogized the reporter/source agreement to a contract of marriage
or one to impair family relations, in which case public policy dictates non-enforce-
ment. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 203. These analogies ignore several distinct features
of the reporter-source relationship. Most notably, this relationship arises in a profes-
Therefore, in the eyes of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the reporter-
source agreement was not a contract at all, but rather an "I'll-scratch-
your-back-if-you'll-scratch-mine" accommodation."" After denying the
existence of a contract, the court next examined whether it should apply
the doctrine of promissory estoppel 2 to enforce the newspapers' prom-
ise. In spite of the court's finding that two of the elements of promissory
estoppel were present-reasonable expectation and reliance on the part
of the promisee-it held that "the moral ambiguity" of the communica-
tions between the reporter and Cohen prevented a finding of the "result-
ing injustice" necessary for enforcement under the theory of promissory
estoppel.'
Finally, the court addressed the First Amendment interests at stake in
a reporter-source agreement.' Focusing on the context in which the
promise arose, the court applied a balancing test between the constitu-
tional rights afforded a free press and the common law interest in en-
forcing a confidentiality agreement.25 The court stated, "[In the classic
First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our dem-
ocratic society, namely a political source involved in a political cam-
paign... it seems to us that the law best leaves the parties here to their
trust in each other."' Accordingly, the court found that the balance
tipped in favor of the press and thus reversed the lower court's
holding.
T
b. The Supreme Court's decision
A sharply divided United States Supreme Court reversed the state
court's ruling, holding that the First Amendment does not bar a source
from recovering damages for breach of a promise of confidentiality.'
sional context, which lacks the trust and confidence generally associated with private
familial agreements. Further, in the context of other "special relationships," such as
marriage or doctor/patient, the law provides a privilege for the communication, not
the communicator. However, in Cohen, the source did not seek to protect the com-
munication to the reporter (i.e., the background information regarding the Democratic
candidate). Rather, he expected his identity to remain secret. See Hirsch, supra note
177, at 179 n.123 (citing Rusher, The Press Rampant, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Nov./Dec., 1979, at 19).
241. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 203.
242. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
243. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 203-04.
244. Id. at 205. See generally Harold W. Suckenick, Don't Rely on Reporters' Confi-
dentiality Promises, O'DWYER'S PR SERvICES REP., Dec. 1990, 29.
245. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). The split among the Justices resulted in a
five to four decision. Justice White authored the majority opinion in which Chief
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The Court quickly dismissed the media defendants' contention that the
court should dispose of the case without reaching the merits because Co-
hen did not raise the promissory estoppel theory in the lower courts and
because the state supreme court's ruling rested solely on its interpreta-
tion of state law." Pointing to the Minnesota court's conclusion that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel would violate the newspapers' First
Amendment rights, the Court declared that the holding below clearly
rested on a matter of federal law.'
Next, the Court summarily addressed the state action issue, rejecting
the newspapers' theory that a private cause of action arising from a con-
fidentiality agreement was insufficient for the purpose of asserting First
Amendment protections."' Relying on the historic rulings of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan' and its progeny, the Court concluded that the
application of state laws in a manner which allegedly threatens First
Amendment interests is sufficient to establish state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Court then turned to the issue of whether state officials may en-
force the doctrine of promissory estoppel when such enforcement would
prevent the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information. Relying
on the Court's decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,' the
newspaper argued that "absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order, "s states may not constitutionally punish publication of
matters of public concern.' The majority, however, maintained that
Smith did not control, and instead looked to another line of cases to
support its contention that because generally applicable laws, such as the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, do not single out the press, they do not
violate the First Amendment simply because they may have "incidental
effects" on. the media. 7 Furthermore, the Court distinguished Smith on
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Justice Blackmun
filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter. Justice Souter also
filed a separate dissent, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined.
See Vicini, supra note 13, at 13.
249. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2517.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2517-18.
252. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
253. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2517-18.
254. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
255. Id. at 103.
256. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2517.
257. Id. at 2518-19 ("[insofar as we are advised, the doctrine [of promissory estop-
the ground that it addressed the issue of criminal sanctions, as opposed
to the compensatory damages which Cohen sought.s The Court rea-
soned that reliance on the holding in Smith prohibiting unfair punish-
ment of press in terms of monetary sanctions is misplaced because
courts may hold the press accountable for the cost of acquiring news-
worthy material.'s In the eyes of the majority, compensatory damages
are no more violative of the First Amendment than generous bonuses
paid to cooperative sources.' ° Moreover, the Court concluded that, un-
like Smith, in which the state defined what publications would trigger
liability, the law of promissory estoppel "simply requires those making
promises to keep them.""
At this point, the Court prematurely dismissed the potential chilling
effects of the promissory estoppel doctrine on primary press functions.
Despite the newspapers' persuasive argument that the incentive to avoid
liability would inhibit reporting of truthful information, the majority con-
cluded that any such effect would be "constitutionally insignificant."'
The Court's reasoning here is troubling. To say that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability begs the question of
whether courts should exempt the press from liability when application
of the doctrine demonstrates more than an "incidental" effect on the
pel] is generally applicable to the daily transaction of all the citizens of Minnesota.").
See Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983) (stressing that press must pay non-discriminatory taxes); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (stating that media may not publish
copyright materials without obeying general copyright laws); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (finding that the First Amendment does not relieve reporter of re-
sponsibility as citizen to answer grand jury subpoena); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (noting that media not exempt from Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (finding that press must
abide by National Labor Relations Act).
258. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
259. Id. The Cohen Court analogized the compensatory damages sought by the pe-
titioner to a liquidated damages provision which it would clearly uphold as a legiti-
mate representation of the cost of breaching a contract for the purpose of publishing
newsworthy and profitable information. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. The Star Tribune and Pioneer Press reasoned that the public would be
prevented from learning the name of a confidential source in instances when that
person's identity was itself newsworthy. Id. Justice Souter made a similar argument
in his dissent where he noted the particular. importance of revealing Cohen's name in
the context of the 1982 gubernatorial election. Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting). In
the Justice's words, exposing Cohen as a confidential source "expanded the universe
of information relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota voters." Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Souter pointed out that publications in the arena of
politics are the type "quintessentially subject to strict First Amendment protection."
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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media's newsgathering and publication functions. Granted, the doctrine
does not, single out the press. However, the Court had previously held
that application of state laws in a manner alleged to restrict First Amend-
ment freedoms warranted heightened protection for the media's Such
protection is the very essence of the traditional notion of a free Ameri-
can press. In fact, the Court did not have to resort to this line of reason-
ing to hold in the petitioner's favor. Treating the newspapers as ordinary
citizens of Minnesota simply reduces this portion of the Court's analy-
sis to a game of semantics, thereby clouding an otherwise insightful argu-
ment against absolute immunity for reporters who break their promises.
Finally, the Court pointed out that the publication of Cohen's name
was not clearly protected as a disclosure of "lawfully" obtained informa-
tion.' Rather, the newspapers decided to publish the information only
after breaking a promise of ccnfidentiality to their source.' However,
the Court reserved final judgment on the legality of the newspapers'
decision to publish and remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme
Court for consideration of Cohen's promissory estoppel claim. 7
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the Court expressly rejected the
argument that a promissory estoppel cause of action would allow a plain-
tiff to avoid the strict requirements for recovery under a claim for libel
or defamation. While some would argue that Cohen's claim bears
more than just an incidential similarity to these torts,M the High Court
263. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 ("[T]he First Amendment
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public
may draw.").
264. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
265. Id. at 2519.
266. Id. The Court distinguished the facts of Cohen from the situation in Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), where the identity of a rape victim was revealed
by a newspaper after legally obtaining it from a police report.
267. Cohen V, ill S. Ct. at 2519-20. While the Court concluded that the Minnesota
Supreme Court may have prematurely dismissed the Cohen's promissory estoppel
claim, thereby commanding reconsideration of the case, it refused to reinstate the
jury verdict awarding Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 2519. The
Court left that issue, as well as the possibility of protection afforded the press under
the Minnesota State Constitution, for the state court to address on remand. Id at
2520.
268. Id. at 2519.
269. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 177, at 180. The author points to the nature of
Cohen's alleged injuries which were characterized as "'[a] kick in the face,' 'embar-
rass[ing],' 'humiliat[ingl,' '[an] assault,' and a variety of other personal harms." Id.
thought otherwise and echoed the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that "Cohen could not sue for defamation because the information
disclosed [his name] was true."" °
In one of two separate dissenting opinions filed by the Court, Justice
Blackmun contended that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision did
not carve an exception for the media to generally applicable state
laws.2"' Justice Blackmun characterized the lower court's decision as
one premised on free speech in the political arena, not on the identity of
the speakers.2" Therefore, he reasoned that because the court had fo-
cused on the public debate-like qualities of the publications at issue, the
state supreme court would afford the same First Amendment protection
to non-media defendants.
Justice Souter, also dissenting, chastised the majority for abandoning
the traditional balancing test applied to matters involving conflicts be-
tween governmental interests and constitutional protections.27" Declar-
(quoting Brief for Appellant at 10, Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) (Nos. C8-
88-2631, CO-88-2672). The author further contends that- the plea to the trial jury to
"'restore .. . [Cohen's] good name'" is further evidence of the parallels between this
action and a tort claim against a media defendent. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant at
10-11, Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Nos. C8-88-2631, CO-88-2672)). While not completely
unpersuasive, this theory narrowly focuses on the similarities between the nature of
the damages sought by Cohen and those of a traditional defamation claim, thereby
failing to adequately address the existence of a voluntary agreement from which the
damages allegedly flowed.
270. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2519 (quoting Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 202).
271. Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) for the proposition that "a state may not adopt a state rule of law to
impose impermissible restrictions on the federal constitutional freedoms of speech
and press").
273. Id. (Blaclamun, J., dissenting). In support of this theory, Justice Blackmun
pointed to the Court's decision in Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988). In Hustler, the Court refused to impose liability against a magazine publisher
for its satirical article about the Reverend Jerry Falwell, even though Virginia's tort
law would have provided for damages under a theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 56. Justice Blackman noted that the Virginia law was cer-
tainly one of "general applicability," yet the Court found that imposing liability for the
publication of a satirical story would unduly restrain the media's First Amendment
freedoms. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun's argument is quite effective, for one could reasonably interpret
that the Minnesota Supreme Court merely applied the same principles articulated in
Hustler. According to this theory, the lower court rejected Cohen's claim because the
state's interest in protecting the sanctity of the confidentiality agreement was not
sufficient to remove the publications from First Amendment protection. Compare
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 with Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05.
274. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting). Contending that the issue
before the Court was not simply a matter of commercial relationships, but rather one
involving a significant effect on the content of speech, Justice Souter would have ap-
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ing that First Amendment interests are at stake when laws concerning
commercial activities arguably affect the content of speech, Justice
Souter argued that Minnesota's law of promissory estoppel should not be
regarded as a law of general applicability without a determination of the
actual impact on First Amendment protections."s He refused to accept
the majority's argument that it was justified in dispensing with the tradi-
tional balancing test because any burden on publication was "self-im-
posed." 8
Finally, Justice Souter sternly criticized the majority for its failure to
adequately address the context in which the newspapers disclosed
Cohen's identity.' Warning that under the majority's approach, courts
could find a waiver of First Amendment rights when the necessary re-
quirements were present,' Justice Souter declared that the value of
protected speech cannot be measured by reference to the speaker alone
without considering the "importance of the information to public dis-
course... [because] freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the
value of enhancing such discourse for the sake of a citizenry better in-
formed and thus more prudently self-governed. " "2 Accordingly, Justice
Souter believed that Cohen's identity provided relevant information upon
which Minnesota voters could draw before casting their ballots in the
1982 election, thereby subjecting the newspapers' disclosures to strict
First Amendment protection.'
2. Fries v. National Broadcasting Co.2'
The case of Police Officer Joseph Fries illustrates another context in
plied the test of constitutionality ariticulated that Justice Harlan articulated:
[W]hen [such effects] have been justified by subordinating valid governmental
interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a
weighing of the governmental interest involved .... Whenever, in such a
context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of
valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that per-
force requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.
Id. (Souter, J, dissenting) (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961)).
275. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 2522-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting).
278. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967).
279. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
281. No. 456687 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1982).
which a reporter-source relationship may arise. Angered and frustrated
by what he perceived to be his department's inadequate response to the
improprieties of a senior officer, Fries assumed the role of a
whistleblower by seeking redress through the media.' In particular,
Fries felt the assistant chiefs actions warranted a more severe penalty:
permanent dismissal from the police force.' Furthermore, he believed
that the entire matter was one of legitimate public concern, and there-
fore, on his own initiative, leaked details of the incident to the press.'
The reporter in whom Fries originally confided eventually revealed his
source's identity, thereby subjecting Fries to ostracism by his peers.
Claiming that he Was unable to work under the severe pressure inflicted
by his coworkers, Fries left the police force and sought damages for
breach of his contract with the reporter.'s The parties eventually
reached a settlement agreement. 7
282. Whistleblowers often leak information when they can no longer tolerate
wasteful or corrupt internal practices, Feeling a sense of powerlessness within their
organizations, they seek to vent their frustrations through channels outside of the
ordinary bureaucratic process. See, e.g., HENTOFF, supra note 58, at 227.
283. The first trial of the Fries case ended in a hung jury, and the parties reached
a settlement prior to the commencement of the second trial. Therefore, case records
do not provide a definitive statement of the facts. See Dicke, supra note 170, at 1555
n.14 (citing Fries v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 456687 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1982).
However, the case garnered sufficient interest among the media to suggest the infor-
mation appearing in the text accompanying notes 282-87.
284. See Stephen Carrizosa, Reporter on Trial in Suit for Release of Source's Name,
LA. DAILY J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 1; Raymond Cox, Reporter Sued for Disclosing
Source, LA. DAILY J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 2.
285. See Carrizosa, supra note 284, at 1.
286. ld. Seasoned Washington reporter Lou Cannon contends that "sources depend
on confidentiality for their job, their reputation and their peace of mind." CANNON,
supra note 176, at 283.
Mindful of the potential chilling effect which forced disclosure of confidential
sources in the government would have, former managing editor of the New York
Times, A.M. Rosenthal wrote:
We will never know what this loss of confidentiality of sources will cost
because we will never know what we might have known. It seems entirely
plain that the destruction of confidentiality of news sources will have an
impact on how much the public knows about every aspect of public affairs.
There will simply be fewer and fewer people in government . . . willing to
take the risk that the press will be able to protect them. It will not all hap-
pen tomorrow but it will happen as long as this country is ready to say that
the price of dissidence is exposure.
Il at 283-84.
287. See supra note 283.
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.3. Ruzicka v. Condd Nast Publications, Inc.'
ill Ruzicka sued her psychiatrist for malpractice, claiming that he
engaged in improper sexual conduct during therapy sessions.' During
a flurry of media coverage, her name and place of employment were
made known to the public, as were allegations about the specific con-
duct of the psychiatrist.' After settling her case, Ruzicka spoke public-
ly about her experiences and was eventually named to a state task force
on the sexual exploitation by psychotherpists.9 ' In 1987, she consented
to an interview with a journalist from Glamour magazine. Ruzicka al-
leged that she agreed to the interview on the conditions that she would
neither be identified nor identifiable from the contents of the article.'
The reporter denied any such explicit conditions, contending that
Ruzicka wanted only a general "masking" and that her request was very
casual.' However, Ruzicka alleged that she resolved any ambiguities by
later reaffirming her desire not to be identified in response to an inquiry
by the reporter.'
The article, published in Glamours September 1988 issue, substituted
Ruzicka's last name with the pseudonym "Lundquist" while using her real
first name, Jill. The piece described "Jill Lundquist's" experiences of
sexual abuse and traced her decision to file suit against her psychiatrist.
The reporter altered other details about Jill's life in an effort to comply
with the masking agreement. ' In spite of the reporter's efforts, Ruzicka
learned that two persons identified her from the article and sued the
reporter and the magazine's publisher, Cond Nast, for breach of con-
288. 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
289. Id at 579-80.
290. Id. at 580 n.3. In August 1981, the Minneapolis Tribune reported the pending
litigation, naming Ruzicka as the plaintiff and including details about her' personal life
such as her place of employment. The following year the Tribune ran an article
describing an agreement between the doctor and the state Board of Medical Examin-
ers and again named Ruzicka. Subsequent articles appeared in both the Tribune and
the St Paul Pioneer Press once again identifying Ruzicka as the victim of therapist
abuse. Id. Interestingly, these newspapers are the same two alleged to have breached
the confidentiality agreement in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
See supra text accompanying note 214.
291. Ruzicka, 939 F.2d at 580 n.3.
292. Id. at 579.
293. See id. at 580.
294. See id,
295. Id.
tract.' The media defendants filed motions for summary judgment
which the district court granted in 1990.2"
The Minnesota District Court began its opinion by reviewing the devel-
opment of defamation law, from its foundation in strict liability at com-
mon law to the First Amendment protections which the Supreme Court
afforded the press in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' Recognizing
the media's heightened protection under tort law, the court questioned
whether similar protections should be granted in contract claims.' In
response, the court applied the same three-prong approach used by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals in Cohen III." However, it reached a
diffent conclusion on each issue. First, the court held that state action
lies in a case where a private party seeks damages under a contract theo-
ry for statements made by a media defendant." Next, the court refused
to find a waiver of the media defendants' First Amendment rights, rea-
soning that even if an agreement did indeed exist between the parties, it
was far too vague for the purpose of waiving constitutional rights.'
The court concluded that "at a minimum, the Constitution requires plain-
tiffs in contract actions to enforce a reporter-source agreement to prove
specific, unambiguous terms and to provide clear and convincing proof
that the agreement was breached."' Thus, according to the district
court, even though the issue was one of contract law and not tort, the
First Amendment afforded the press some protection against claims for
breach of a reporter-source agreement.'
296. Id. Ruzicka claimed that the inclusion of facts, such as her first name, resi-
dence, occupation, and her participation on the state task force, constituted the
breach. The last detail was the critical factor for purposes of identification because
the task force's public report listed all members, and she was the sole female partici-
pant. Id. However, Ruzicka admitted that the two persons who identified her were
her former therapists, persons who had extensive knowledge of her background prior
to publication of the article. Id. The complaint contained a variety of tort claims, in-
cluding fraudulent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, false light, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The court quickly dismissed these claims, as well as
one for unjust enrichment. Id. at 580-81.
297. Id. at 581.
298. Ruzicka v. Cond6 Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1292-93 (D. Minn.
1990).
299. Id. at 1293.
300. See supra notes 232-35.
301. Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
302. Id at 1296-98.
303. Id, at 1300.
304. Id. at 1298-1301. Cf Virelli v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 536 N.Y.S.2d
571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). VireUi illustrates how the Minnesota Court of Appeals
might have treated the Ruzicka case had the issue been one of tort law and not
contract. The plaintiffs consented to an interview regarding their daughter's drug
abuse. Id. at 573. They contended that the reporter negligently breached an agree-
[Vol. 20: 115, 1992] Confidential Source Agreements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Ruzicka appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ren-
dered its opinion less than a month after the United States Supreme
Court decided the case of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.' The court con-
cluded that regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen, Minne-
sota law did not permit a finding of legally enforceable agreement when
a reporter makes a promise of confidentiality." Thus, state law barred
Ruzicka's breach of contract suit. 7 Addressing the theory of promisso-
ry estoppel, the court emphasized that under most circumstances it does
not consider new claims advanced on appeal.' However, the court de-
termined that it would be unfair to bar Ruzicka's claim when Cohen was
permitted to press his promissory estoppel action although he never for-
mally pled it." Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions for the lower court to allow Ruzicka to amend
her complaint should it determine that Ruzicka's promissory estoppel
claim was significantly different from the breach of contract claim.3 0
IV. SOURCE EXPECTATIONS VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
FOR THE MEDIA: THE CONFLICT CONTINUES
A. Application of Contract Theory in the Wake of Cohen
The majority in Cohen recognized that contract theory allows parties
to exercise personal autonomy when formulating enforceable agree-
ments." However, even if the elements of a valid contract are present
ment not to reveal their identities and to allow them the opportunity to review the
article prior to publication. The plaintiffs brought suit for invasion of privacy, negli-
gence and intentional inflicition of emotional distress. Id. at 572. The court held that
the article was a matter of public interest, and therefore the plaintiff's allegations
were insufficient. Id. at 574-76. Because the damages sought were solely attributed to
injured reputation, humiliation, and emotional distress, the court found that the con-
stitutional standards applicable to defamation and invasion of privacy actions applied.
Id. at 575-76. Not surprisingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that because
the reporter broke a promise to protect the plaintiffs' identities, the constitutional
protections usually afforded the press were rendered inapplicable. See id. at 576.
305. Ruzdcka v. Cond6 Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
306. Id. at 582.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 582-83.
310. Id. at 583-84.
311. Coen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519 (1991). 'Minnesota law simply requires those
making promises to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case, determine the
scope of their legal obligations and any restrictions which may be placed on the
when a reporter promises a source anonymity in exchange for informa-
tion,"' holding a media defendant liable under a theory of promissory
estoppel for later disclosing the source's identity penalizes the reporting
of truthful information."" Proponents of the promissory estoppel model
contend that it treats all citizens fairly by refusing to grant immunity on
the basis of one's affiliation with the press." ' However, this theory plac-
es undue emphasis on the identity of the publisher rather than the infor-
mation she seeks to report. When a reporter discloses information re-
garding a matter of public concern which she originally obtained in con-
fidence, courts must look beyond the reporter-source relationship and
instead focus on the public interests served by the disclosure."5 Those
who argue that such an approach affords disproportionate protection to
the media.should take note of Justice Blackmun's articulate dissent in
Cohen. As the Justice aptly points out, impermissible restrictions on
freedoms of speech and press are equally available to non-media defen-
dants who choose to reveal truthful, newsworthy information."6
Accordingly, the application of a promissory estoppel theory to reporter-
source agreements warrants closer examination when it is based upon
the faulty assumption that without this theory, the press has special
immunities."1
Generally, one may characterize the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
a relatively benign means of upholding traditional principles of equity. 8
publication of truthful information are self-imposed." Id
312. The three elements of a legally enforceable contract are offer, acceptance, and
consideration. In addition, most courts require a fourth element for the contract to be
valid. the parties must have intended legal consequences to flow from their agree-
ment. Courts traditionally use an objective test to determine whether the manifes-
tations of the parties demonstrate such an intent. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 154, at §§ 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 4-1. See also Dicke, supra note 170, at 1567 n.77.
A source's request for anonymity constitutes an offer, while a reporter's agree-
ment thereto represents both an acceptance and consideration in the form of a
promise. The consideration supplied by the source is found in the information provid-
ed to the reporter. See id.
313. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 2519-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
315. Protected disclosure would be most appropriate when the information concerns
matters of public debate, health and safety, or national security. This theory is con-
sistent with the decision in Cohen IV, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court found
it to be of 'critical significance" that "the promise of anonymity arises in the classic
First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our democratic soci-
ety, namely, a political source involved in a political campaign." Cohen IV, 457
N.W.2d 199, 205 (1990).
316. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Lovell v. Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 ("The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals .... The press in its historic connotiation comprehends every sort of
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.")).
317. See id.
318. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981) ("Neither real nor
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However, when the doctrine discourages the disclosure of truthful infor-
mation, one cannot say that it has a merely incidental burden on the vital
functions of the press. To the extent that the High Court's decision in
Cohen sanctions truthful speech, a search for a more balanced approach
to the confidential source dilemma is warranted.
B. The Pitfalls of the Promissory Estoppel Model and Its Alternatives
Confidentiality agreements generally assist the media in performing
their primary functions: newsgathering, analyzing and interpreting gath-
ered information, and publishing information for the public's benefit.1
Reporter-source agreements also benefit the anonymous source, who has
the ability to convey newsworthy information in exchange for the prom-
ise that his identity will not be revealed or that information provided
exclusively for background purposes will not be published.'m Never-
theless, the supposed benefits and security of confidentiality agreements
sometimes weigh heavily on the freedoms enjoyed by the media. Sources
legitimately expect that journalists will honor their agreements, and this
restrains the press from publishing all of the information which the re-
porter gathered. However, it is important to note that journalists general-
ly impose these restraints upon themselves." In the typical confidenti-
ality agreement scenario, the reporter voluntarily promises to protect the
identity of sources for the all-important purpose of obtaining valuable
information.
Journalists typically do not dispute the voluntary nature of their agree-
apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a
contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal rela-
tions may prevent the formation of a contract").
319. See generaUy, William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free
Press: A Comment On Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L REV.
1 (1980). While confidentiality agreements enhance a reporter's newsgathering abilities,
the gravamen of a breach of such a contract is injury through publication, not
through newsgathering. Allegations of tortious newsgathering activity are generally re-
served for claims for invasion of privacy, even though publication may follow the pri-
vacy invasion. See Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,
76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1279 (1976). Some courts allow additional compensation for
the plaintiff in a privacy action by awarding further damages flowing from subsequent
publication. However, the court generally states that the intrusion tort itself is a
newsgathering claim. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir.
1971).
320. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
321. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519 (1991).
ments with sources.' Nevertheless, many members of the media be-
lieve that breach of contract actions unfairly penalize the media for pro-
viding truthful and newsworthy information, thereby violating the First
Amendment.' In contrast, viewed from the perspective of an anony-
mous source, court enforcement of a confidentiality agreement merely
satisfies the fundamental elements of contract law.' In the eyes of a
source, a breach of contract action simply asks a court to assess the in-
juries to the source arising from a media entity's disregard for a volun-
tary agreement. However, the use of secrecy and the sharing of knowl-
edge unavailable to the general public creates a unique backdrop for
reporter-source relations, thereby justifying consideration of confidenti-
ality agreements outside the context of traditional contractual relations.
The promissory estoppel model as endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.' fails to appreciate the important distinc-
tions of the modus operandi underlying a reporter-source agreement.
First, unlike formal contracts where the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties are clearly defined, confidentiality agreements generally contain
vague and imprecise terms.' One might attribute this indefiniteness to
the foundation of trust upon which a reporter and source base their
relationship. ? Sharing private information fosters feelings of intimacy
and solidarity and relieves the need to clearly establish conditions of dis-
loyalty.' Moreover, journalists typically work under strict deadlines.
These time constraints make the formation of an explicit contract im-
practical and unlikely. Hence, a contract action brought by a source
potentially undermines the well-established tenet that uncertainty regard-
ing liability should be kept to a minimum when First Amendment inter-
322. See, e.g., id, at 2516 (neither the reporter nor her source disputed that the
confidentiality agreement was the product of mutual consent).
323. See Langley & Levine, supra note 118, at 24. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1974), the Supreme Court indicated that the press operates at its
zenith when publishing truthful information. Id. at 495-96.
324. See Dicke, supra note 170, at 1569.
325. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
326. See Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Emprirical Study, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 229, 284 (1971). Professor Blasi notes that while some contracts may be more
explicit when they involve sophisticated sources, the general rule is that confidentiali-
ty agreements are indefinite. Id. at 243.
327. See John P. Borger, Publication Torts as Contracts and Misrepresentations:
Redirecting Judicial Focus, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1990, at 35, 43 (PLI Pat., Copyrights,
Trademarks and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 294, 1990).
328. See Levi, supra note 3, at 706-07. Suggesting a context-sensitive approach to
the confidential source dilemma, Professor Levi offers detailed analysis of what she
terms the "double-edged" character of reporter-source relations. lI& She contends that
society feels ambivalent about secrecy because it may engender positive moral values
such as solidarity and self-esteem, while simultaneously fostering disloyalty, anxiety,
and the risk of manipulation. Id.
164
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ests are at stake.' In other words, because a journalist's relationship
with her source naturally rests on a vague foundation, courts should
evaluate the validity of a source's claim in light of unique context of the
agreement. Furthermore, the vague, imprecise and oral nature of con-
fidentiality agreements may give rise to complicated evidentiary dis-
putes.' ° Consequently, the judge or jury hearing such a case confronts
the word of one party against the other. Such indefiniteness may poten-
tially lead to time-consuming and expensive litigation concerning the
terms of a confidentiality agreement and create the very type of self-
censorship that undermines First Amendment interests."
Perhaps the most obvious solution to conflicts that arise from confi-
dentiality agreements would be for the press to permanently refrain from
granting confidentiality in the first place. This would alleviate the dilem-
ma faced by the editor, who must choose between honoring the agree-
ment of her reporter and publishing what she considers to be newswor-
thy information. Arguably, this approach would dispose of the problems
associated with the indefiniteness of such contracts. However, members
of the press are quick to complain that this approach would unduly hin-
der the media's newsgathering function and would consequently inhibit
the dissemination of valuable public information.' Modem journalists
rely heavily upon confidential sources in performing their essential du-
ties,' and the information obtained often leads to the development of
329. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
330. The trial judge in Cohen was forced to confront one such problem arising out
of the oral nature of the reporter-source agreement. Ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the judge found that in spite of the absence of a written agreement, the
contract satisfied the statute of frauds because the parties could perform in less than
a year arLd because the source had already performed his obligations by providing
information to the reporter. See Cohen I, 14 Media L. Rep. 1460 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1987) (Knoll, J., denying motion for summary judgment).
331. The area of defamation law provides a useful example of the cost to First
Amendment values. The potential cost of defending a libel suit may sometimes halt
the investigation of high-risk stories or ultimately prevent their publication. See Liti-
gation Costs and SeUf-Censorship, L.A. DAILY J., June 19, 1981, at 18.
332. See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1974) (stating that "[w]ithout
the information provided by the press most of us ... would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally");
see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (stating that "[t]he press serves
and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by govern-
mental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected
by the people responsible to all the people .. ").
333. Professor Vincent Blasi authored the seminal study on the relationship between
reporters and confidential informants. His 1971 report showed that the average
critical news stories.'
At the opposite end of the spectrum, an alternative solution to the
confidential source dilemma would be to grant the press absolute immu-
nity under the First Amendment, thereby shielding a reporter from liabili-
ty should the name of the source be revealed in the future. Under this
approach, one might argue that a source should assume the risk that a
journalist might disclose information that the source did not intend to re-
veal.' However, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the
First Amendment affords the press any such absolute protection.' In-
stead, the Court has adopted a policy which balances the interests of the
First Amendment against those protected by common law causes of
action. 7 Furthermore, this alternative negates the important role of le-
gally enforceable contracts in modem society. Granting the media abso-
lute immunity from the consequences of ignoring a legitimate agreement
unfairly deprives sources of the ability to rely upon voluntary promises
and to pursue a claim when the press fails to fulfill a contractual ob-
ligation.' This approach leaves sources in an unfairly vulnerable posi-
tion while giving the media excessive protection, and fails to treat the
interests of both parties fairly.
While courts should not abrogate the requirement to uphold contractu-
al obligations when the enforcement of a contract threatens the funda-
mental activities of the media, the judicial system must impose constitu-
tional limitations.' In order to develop a fair and practical standard,
newsperson surveyed relied on confidential sources for 22.296 to 34.4% of his stories.
See Blasi, supra note 326, at 247. A 1985 survey demonstrates an average reliance on
confidential sources of 31.2596. John E. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Priv-
ilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence After A Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM.
Hum. RTS. L REV. 57, 73 (1985).
334. See Zerilli .v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
335. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confi-
dential Relationship, 80 YALE L REv. 317, 342 (1970).
336. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("[Albsolute pro-
tection for the communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing
value served by the law of defamation."); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-3 (1984).
337. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First
Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, resolution of the is-
sue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.").
338. The Supreme Court has found that "tension necessarily exists between the
need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing
wrongful injury." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. This tension must be resolved by reconciling
the interests of both parties. See id.
339. Cf. William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from
the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution," 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 793, 817-19. Van Alstyne argues that especially when addressing new causes of
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courts must weigh society's interest in upholding contractual undertak-
ings against the threat to core First Amendment protections, an admit-
tedly difficult task given the conflicting values at stake.
C. Is a Balancing Approach Possible, or Must the Scales Necessarily
Tip in Favor of a Reporter or Her Source?
Having described the various approaches to the legal and philosophical
dilemmas arising from reporter-source agreements, and having concluded
that the Supreme Court's most recent treatment of this issue does not
adequately address the First Amendment implications of enforcement,
this Comment now explores the possibility of a more balanced approach
to the contract-First Amendment conflict.
Some courts have modified or have refused to enforce contracts which
would interfere with First Amendment rights. 4 ° For example, in
Fuentes v. Shevin,' the Supreme Court applied the strict test of volun-
tary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, and concluded that persons who
signed conditional sales contracts did not waive constitutional rights to a
due process hearing prior to the repossession of their property. " As
one commentator notes, if traditional notions of the "sanctity of con-
tracts" were truly strong enough to override relevant constitutional inter-
ests, the Court need not have addressed a waiver analysis.' Thus, the
Court appears to have allowed the media sufficient room to argue that
courts cannot justify overriding governmental interest which would allow
a burden on First Amendment rights by merely pointing to the general
societal interests in upholding voluntary agreements.3
action, courls must steadfastly apply constitutional standards when the action threat-
ens First Amendment values. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256 (1974) (finding that new restraints on publishing are subject to traditional
constitutional standards).
340. This approach is demonstrated in several decisions which involve written
secrecy agreements signed by CIA agents as a condition of their employment. Al-
though the agreements allegedly required that agents never divulge any nonpublic in-
formation concerning the CIA, the agents retained their First Amendment rights to
publish unclassified information, as well as classified information already in the hands
of the public. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510, 511 (1980); United States
v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
1309, 1313, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
341. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
342. Id. at 94-96.
343. See Borger, supra note 327, at 51.
344. Id.
Application of contract principles to confidentiality agreements also
raises the issue of fraud. While contract law provides a remedy for the
source whose identity is eventually revealed, the reporter who pledges
confidentiality might lack the capacity to protect himself from the receipt
of false information." Thus, reporters justifiably fear potential abuse of
the shield of anonymity by a source who intentionally acts as a conduit
for false information.' Although journalists may indeed be vulnerable
to such abuse, the law affords them certain protections from fraudulent
sources." The contract theory of fraudulent misrepresentation pro-
vides relief for a reporter when a source provides false information in
return for anonymity." Should the journalist discover that a confiden-
tial source has lied, or if the journalist enters into an agreement with the
belief that he obtained sensitive information which later proves to be
false, the source has defrauded him.' ° The theory of fraudulent mis-
representation provides relief by enabling the reporter to either avoid the
contract or sue in tort.3I The former remedy would allow the obligor to
act as if he had never made the agreement, thereby enabling the reporter
to reveal the identity of an unscrupulous source without the fear of lia-
bility.-
As with any issue concerning liability under contract law, courts must
consider relevant issues of public policy in determining whether to en-
force a confidentiality agreement.' When public policy outweighs the
interest of protecting the sancity of contracts, a contract becomes unen-
forceable.' Respect for public policy demands that courts examine
many issues, including: the expectations of the contracting parties, losses
flowing from the abandonment of the original agreement, and the
strength and relative merits of the public policy.' Ultimately, courts
will not enforce a contract when public policy "clearly outweighs" the
345. See Kathryn M. Kase, Note, When a Promise Is Not a Promise: The Legal
Consequences For Journalists Who Break Promises of Confidentiality To Sources, 12
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 565, 582-83 (1990) (describing theory of fraudulent mis-
representation as a means of combatting the fraudulent source).
346. See Langley & Levine, supra note 118, at 22.
347. Id, at 24.
348. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 154, at § 9-13.
349. For a general discussion on the theory of fraudulent misrepresentation as it ap-
plies to the reporter-source relationship, see Kase, supra note 345, at 582-83.




354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
355. Other important factors include the public interest protected by enforcement of
the contract, future development of the relevant public policy, and consideration of legisla-
tion or judicial decree. Id, at §§ 178(2), (3)(a)-(b), cmt. b, 179 (b).
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need for enforcement of the contract, irrespective of the origin of the
policy.'
Those 'who question the contract model also rely upon the well-estab-
lished theory that contract law exists for the purpose of furthering com-
mercial relationships,' thereby implying that reporter-source relation-'
ships do not fall under this rubric. While one approach to the law of
contracts promotes contract enforcement as a means of ensuring eco-
nomic efficiency,' another school of thought focuses on the ethical
concerns of keeping promises. The latter approach appears to be the
dominant one among media commentators who fail to characterize the
reporter-source relationship in terms of its commercial implications,
pointing instead to the divergent attitudes of the media and commercial
enterprises.'m They contend that the media has a well known distaste
for government intervention, especially the type which seeks to regulate
its newsgathering and publication functions. In contrast, commercial en-
terprises seek governmental involvement, especially when it aids com-
merce in the court system."I Yet others would argue that the commer-
cial aspects of a reporter-source agreement are undeniable when the
contract :results in increased circulation, sales, or advertising.' While
not wholly unpersuasive, the latter argument does not sufficiently sup-
port a finding that the rights and liabilities of reporters and sources are
equivalent to the rights of parties to a traditional contract. It merely
suggests that the question of the validity of legal claims by sources de-
mands further consideration.
The recent willingness of the Supreme Court to apply the principles of
contract to a publication-based claim against the press'm has stirred
heated debate among media watchdog organizations, legal commentators,
and defense counsel.' While the Court's opinion was much anticipated
356. 1& at § 178, cmt. b.
357. See Langley & Levine, supra note 118, at 24.
358. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 154, at § 1-4 (e) (stating that some com-
mentators characterize contract law as a market mechanism).
359. See id § 1-4 (b) (upholding the principles of contract law enforces the morali-
ty of keeping promises).
360. See, e.g., Langley & Levine, supra note 118, at 24.
361. See i.
352. See Cohen 11, 15 Media L Rep. (BNA) 2288, 2290 (Minn. Dist Ct 1988).
363. See Cohen V, 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991).
364. In the wake of Cohen, one commentator notes that Supreme Court Justices,
who lack a working knowledge of the media, set forth increasingly restrictive stan-
dards for journalists. Harwood, supra note 121, at C6. However, a spokesperson for
by both sides to the issue and certainly welcomed by those who favor
heightened protection for the "sanctity of contracts," it is doubtful that
the Cohen decision will prove to be the final word on this constitutional-
ly sensitive topic. Prior to a clear ruling by the High Court, interested
parties scrambled for their own appropriate standard. As a result, two
dominant themes emerged which incorporate both First Amendment
concerns and the realities of modem journalism practices.' Therefore,
they are still worthy of consideration even in light of Cohen.
The first theory, propounded by media advocates, concerns self-auton-
omy. They argue that, at least when dealing with truthful, lawfully ob-
tained information of newsworthy value, courts should refrain from inter-
fering with decisions in the newsroom.' Editorial decisions concerning
what should and should not be published are best left to experienced
journalists. 7 Under this approach, the fundamental rules of contract
law do nothing to bolster a source's chances of recovery. The most obvi-
ous concern arising from the self-autonomy approach is that absent
court-imposed sanctions, members of the press are free to break promis-
es whenever it is necessary -"in the interest of news."' While critics ar-
gue that the resulting uncertainty would cause confidential sources to
cease providing information, the Supreme Court has noted that no con-
clusive evidence shows proof of this effect on sources.'
The persuasiveness of this approach is further evidenced in the brief
submitted by the Cowles Media Company to the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Cowles Media argued that contract law is unnecessary to protect
a source who wishes to keep his identity a secret.37 Under this theory,
court-imposed penalties are considered far less effective than profession-
al pressures such as those experienced by journalists who choose jail or
the right-wing media watchdog group Accuracy in Media, praised the Court's decision,
remarldng that contract liability will help to insure a reporter's promise to a source.
See Vicini, supra note 13.
365. For a summary of recent briefs and law review articles regarding the appropri-
ate standard to apply to the contract law versus First Amendment debate, see Borger,
supra note 327, at 37-64.
366. See id. at 56.
367. See Harwood, supra note 121.
368. See Cohen 111, 445 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("We do not think
it an undue burden to require the press to keep its promises.").
369. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-95 (1972) (finding insufficient evi-
dence to determine whether sources dry up due to possibility that a reporter may be
forced to reveal the identity of sources before a grand jury). See also Blasi, supra
note 318, at 265-67. Professor Blasi reports that the threat that reporters might be
forced to respond to grand jury questioning resulted in "poisoning the atmosphere" of
reporter/source relations as opposed to an absolute depletion of sources. Id.
370. See Borger, supra note 327, at 60 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 37-43, Cohen
IV, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990)).
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the payment of fines over forced disclosure of a source's identity.'
Furthermore, some view contract law as merely a "crude tool" when ap-
plied to the arena of professional journalism.' In other words, if a
court must narrowly focus on whether a contract was formed and subse-
quently breached, "contract law engenders 'the perverse result that
truthful publication... [is] less protected by the First Amendment than
even the least protected defamatory falsehoods.'"' Second, news orga-
nizations argue that even if courts find themselves bound by the prin-
ciples of contract law, they must modify traditional theories of contract
in order to accomodate First Amendment values. " This approach sug-
gests that courts apply a subjective standard, taking into consideration
actual conduct of the reporter as well as what he intended by his prom-
ise."' This would avoid arbitrarily imposed liability on the news organi-
zation on the basis of "apparent authority" or "imparted conduct or
knowledge. " 6 In addition, media defense counsel suggest that in order
for courts to reach a fair determination of the damages flowing from a
breach of the a confidentiality agreement, the parties must have clearly
contemplated the possible economic consequences of their contract at
the time of its formation.' In the words of one news organization:
Only the source can know what he or she is trying to protect by remaining anony-
mous. If the source wishes to convert the reporter's pledge of confidentiality into
a legally binding contract, it seems only fair that the source be required to dis-
close the feared consequences of breach, so that the press can intelligently evalu-
ate its legal risks, if any."
These constitutional and ethical concerns warrant further consider-
ation by lower courts when they apply the standard set forth by the Su-
preme Court in the Cohen decision. Just as strict adherence to the terms
of traditional contracts must sometimes yield to public policy con-
cerns,= courts must evaluate reporter-source agreements in terms of
their potential cost to First Amendment interests. At a minimum, courts
371. Id. at 60-61.
372. Id. at 61.
373. Id. (quoting Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989)).
374. See Borger, supr note 327, at 47.
375. Id. at 49 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 26-36, Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989)).
376. Id.
377. See Borger, supra note 327, at 63 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 26-36, Cohen
111, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)).
378. Id.
379. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1), (2), (3) (a) (b) (1981).
should enforce confidentiality agreements only to the extent that they
can be viewed objectively and do not infringe upon the editorial process.
This requires that the terms of a contract be narrowly construed and
enforced only to the extent that the agreement is mutual and clearly ex-
pressed by both parties.
Of course, one can make credible policy arguments in favor of enforc-
ing a reporter's silence even when the newsworthiness of a source's
identity would make disclosure a matter of public interest. However,
questions of policy are always intertwined with factual issues and, conse-
quently, must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Inevitably, reporters
will probably continue to claim the right to reveal a source's identity in
certain circumstances regardless of the Cohen decision. Assuming that
the reporter asserts a First Amendment interest, there are several rea-
sons judges would examine a constitutional challenge with a sympathetic
eye. First, a court could narrowly tailor a decision in the reporter's favor
to fit the specific facts of the case at bar. A court need not necessarily
ignore the principle of stare decisis nor strike down the alleged benefits
of a contract/promissory estoppel approach in exceptional cases in
which disclosure would not undermine society's interest in upholding the
sanctity of contracts.' Second, judges might be convinced that invali-
dating the rigid rules of contract would benefit society in limited circum-
stances. For example, loosening strict standards of confidentiality would
not necessarily undermine the role sources play in providing important
information in the political arena Rather it would open questionable
source conduct to the type of public discussion envisioned by framers of
the Constitution." More importantly, recognizing that First Amendment
concerns may compel a reporter to breach a confidentiality agreement,
sources would think twice before using a reporter as the means to air
politically sensitive information.' While these theories are only specu-
lative, they prompt further consideration of the appropriate standard of
press liability. Against this background, courts may feel compelled to
examine a less doctrinal approach when the press breaks its promises.
380. See, e.g., Borger, supra note 327, at 63. In its brief to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, the Cowles Media Company argued that strict adherence to contract prin-
ciples is not warranted in situations in which the parties to a reporter-source agree-
ment do not clearly express the terms of the agreement in writing or these terms are
the subject of dispute. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant, at 26-36, Cohen I1, 445 N.W.
2d 248 .(Minn. Ct. App. 1989)).
381. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
382. See suprm notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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D. Breach of Confidence: Looking Toward a British Model to Resolve
the Tension Between Contract Principles and the First Amendment
The issue of whether or not a court should enforce a reporter-source
agreement. of confidentiality poses significant risks to First Amendment
freedoms as well as to the freedom to contract. Enforcement of the con-
tract or an award of damages under a tort theory would ignore well-es-
tablished constitutional restrictions on suits against the press.' On the
other hand, causes of action under a contract theory should not be used
to circumvent the traditionally high barrier that protects the press from
civil suits.' Resolving this conflict between tort and contract theory
requires a balancing of interests.' Previously proposed standards that
incorporate a balancing approach have also considered the interests
served by traditional causes of action such as breach of contract, defa-
mation, false light, and invasion of privacy.' However, proposals that
attempt to address the complex issues of confidentiality agreements by
analogy fail to adequately address concerns about the unique circum-
stances of a reporter-source relationship. News tips and leaks have been
characterized as a reporter's lifeblood." The sources chosen by a re-
porter may have a profound impact on matters of public interest, thereby
affecting a reporter's professional reputation and self-esteem. More
importantly, cooperative sources "[enable] the press the function as an
independent watchdog of government and other powerful groups."'
383. See generally RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 1.02[3]-3.36[5], 8.01[2]-
8.10[5][6], at 1-6 to 3-86, 8-3 to 8-37 (1986) (surveying development of heightened
protection for the press under constitutional standards).
384. See id.
385. When a complex fact situation involving traditional causes of action threatens
to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, the law must respond with a stan-
dard that balances the competing interests. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (suggesting that nontraditional threats to the
media's publication function can be subject to constitutional standards).
386. See Borger, supra note 327, at 44.
387. See, e.g., SABATO, supra note 65, at 94-95. Sabato characterizes leads provided
by sources as "the chief currency of investigative journalism." Id. Without tips and
leaks, Sabato believes that "it would be impossible for journalism to function well."
Id. Even when a source is unable to provide the necessary details for a fulilblown
news expos6, her tip offers the hope that a reporter will be able to unearth more
information about a hidden scandal. Id.
388. See id. at 94.
389. See Levi, supra note 3, at 711.
Conversely, sources seek to employ journalists as a means of tapping
valuable resources of power and influence just as often as they them-
selves are used by the press.'s Sources such as the political player or
malicious gossip, who use the media for purely selfish motives, are un-
likely to elicit much sympathy. However, this is not the case when the
source takes both personal and professional risks in an effort to bring
newsworthy information to the public's attention. In this context, the
source seeks anonymity purely as a defense against later reprisals by
friends or coworkers." Each of these factors demands consideration in
any attempt to develop an effective analysis of source confidentiality
claims. This Comment suggests that existing contract and tort prototypes
fail to adequately consider the varied and unusual contexts of confidenti-
ality agreements. Therefore, courts should look to the British legal sys-
tem to develop a new tort, breach of confidence.' In considering
breach of confidence, it is not the goal of this Comment to suggest a
complete shift away from either First Amendment theory or a contract
analysis. Rather, the primary focus is to emphasize the importance of a
contextual approach-both in determining issues of free speech and in
assessing liability under traditional principles of contract.
If Watergate had taken place in Great Britain, and Woodward and
Bernstein decided to reveal the identity of their famous source, "Deep
Throat," they probably would have found themselves in deep legal trou-
ble. In fact, the court might have forced them to compensate their source
with enough monetary damages to allow him to live out his days in royal
style. In Great Britain, the case would likely be tried as a breach of con-
fidence which provides sources with a means of legal redress when a
party breaks a promise of confidentiality by disclosing information with-
out the permission of the source.' The historic roots of this cause of
390. See SABATO, supra note 66, at 95 (suggesting that sources, both professional
and novice, regularly plant "tips" which may lead to a "jackpot" story).
391. This situation was poignantly illustrated in the Pries case. See supra text
accompanying notes 281-87.
392. For a complete discussion of this tort, including its historical basis, present
contours, and likelihood of future development in the United States, see Alan B.
Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 CoLuM. L REv. 1426
(1982) (proposing that nonpersonal relationships customarily thought to impose an
obligation of confidence should serve as the starting point for the development of an
American breach of confidence tort).
393. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW G.L NICOL, MEDIA LAW 112 (1984). Al-
though the United States has yet to formally adopt the breach of confidence tort, the
foundation for this proposed cause of action can be traced to two lines of cases,
those involving physicians and banks. Vickery, supra note 392, at 1428-31 (citing Doe
v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding doctor liable for breach of confi-
dence for disclosing information about former patient obtained during course of
medical treatment); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961)
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action date back to nineteenth-century England when business-related
lawsuits were designed to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of infor-
mation revealed in the course of business dealings.' Under modem
British law, breach of confidence exists as an equitable doctrine designed
to protect a variety of confidential relationships, including attorney-cli-
ent, banker-customer, and husband-wife.' 5 Therefore, extending this
tort to cover those instances in which a reporter breaks a promise of
confidentiality to a source does not seem far-fetched.'
Although it appears that an action for breach of confidence might
apply to a broad and diverse range of confidences, the theory has not
been met with great enthusiasm in the United States. This might seem
surprising in a country where the right of privacy erjoys such an elevat-
ed and highly protected status.' The problem might be attributed to
the arguably difficult task of developing an appropriate test for confiden-
tiality. How would courts distinguish a source's claim against a reporter
from that of a commercial enterprise whose trade secret has been leaked
to competitors? Would the same test of confidentiality apply between
spouses or to those privy to grand jury testimony? While the applica-
(holding bank manager liable under breach of confidence theory after revealing infor-
mation about customer's deteriorating finances to customer's employer).
394. The first English case establishing breach of confidence as a distinct theory of
legal redress occurred in 1849. In Prince Albert v. Strange, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.
1849), Lord Cottenham declared that a breach of confidence claim would provide an
alternate theory of recovery for royal etchings which had been stolen and secretly
copied. Id. at 1178-79.
395. See Vickery, supra note 392, at 1453.
396. One plaintiff relied upon this theory in a lawsuit against a media organization
that depended heavily on confidential sources. Sun Printers Ltd. v. Westminster Press
Ltd., [1982] I.R.L.R. 292 (C.A. 1982), available in LEXIS, ENGEN Library, CASES File
(private company seeking to protect confidential information about company's future
from publication in local newspaper).
397. In the often-quoted words of Justice Brandeis, the constitutional right of priva-
cy is "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). TRIBE, supra note 165, at §§ 15-1, 15-2 (surveying judicial
and scholarly approaches to this "paradoxical right").
398. The Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutionality of grand jury secre-
cy laws in Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990). The Court resisted the tempta-
tion to adopt a standard which would categorically exempt grand jury information
from First Amendment scrutiny. Because the law at issue in Butterworth was broad,
it is difficult to ascertain the exact legal standard applied by courts when the word-
ing of a statute is more precise. Hence, the Court found that some governmental in-
terests were not "substantial," while others were not directly "advanced" by the grand
tion of the breach of confidence tort is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, it does raise the possibility of a slippery slope when applied to
matters of American jurisprudence. Recent opinions suggest ways in
which courts might develop a flexible standard for issues of confidenti-
ality.' For example, in Connick v. Myers," the Supreme Court em-
ployed a sliding scale to determine the degree of protection afforded the
speech of public employees: "[wihether an employee's speech ad-
dresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content,
form, and context of a given statement .... [T]he state's burden in justi-
fying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the
employee's expression."'2
The extension of Connick's employee speech standard to the reporter-
source relationship warrants consideration. Arguably, when a source
uses a journalist for her own selfish motives, the journalist becomes the
source's employee when she consents to a confidentiality agreement.4"
By analogy, if a court were to focus on the content, form, and context of
a politically prompted disclosure of a source like the one in Cohen, the
reporter's disclosure of the source's identity would most likely warrant
protection.' First, a court could find that a person with ties to the po-
litical arena has no absolute expectation of confidence when she seeks
to use media channels to bear upon a political issue. Alternatively, this
tort allows for broad public policy exceptions such as a compelling pub-
lic interest." In contrast, a reporter who reveals the identity of a
whistleblower creates the precise circumstances in which liability under
a theory of breach of confidence would be justified, provided that the
source makes an affirmative showing that the public interest in enforcing
the confidentiality agreement outweighs the public interest in disclosing
her' identity.e
The courts' failure to adopt a formal cause of action for breach of
jury law. Id. at 632-36.
399. For a detailed discussion of the development of confidentiality rules in the free
speech arena, see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality
Constitutional, 75 IOWA L. REv. 601, 615-25 (1990).
400. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
401. Id. at 147-48.
402. Id. at 147-48, 150.
403. See SABATO, supra note 66, at 94-95.
404. See Vickery, supra note 392, at 1458 (quoting Woodward v. Hutchins, [1977] 1
W.LR. 760, 763-64 (C.A.) (-'The Attorney-General must show (a) that such publication
would be a breach of confidence; (b) that the public interest requires that the publi-
cation be restrained, and (c) that there are no other facts of the public interest con-
tradictory of and more compelling than that relied upon.'")).
405. See id. (finding that plaintiff carries the burden of proof under the public inter-
est limitation).
406. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652-E (1977).
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confidence might stem from the development of separate body of tort
law protecting privacy rights under a variety of other theories. ' Never-
theless, this tort, while by no means novel, deserves consideration. Sup-
port for this contention dates back to 1890, when Warren and Brandeis
first propoSed the common law right of privacy and mentioned breach of
confidence as one method of recovery."
If the breach of confidence tort gained acceptance in the United
States, a successful claim for breach of confidence arising from a report-
er-source agreement would rest upon the plainties ability to prove the
existence of three key elements: (1) a showing that the information was
confidential; (2) a promise from the journalist to keep the information
secret; and (3) a demonstration by the source that the journalist
breached the terms of the agreement by revealing the secret informa-
tion." The second requirement effectively places the burden upon the
source to prove the existence of a contract and is likely to be the most
difficult element to satisfy. This was indeed the case in Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co.,"' where the indefiniteness of a reporter-source agreement
precluded the Minnesota Supreme Court from finding liability on the ba-
sis of a standard contractual relationship."1 However, some courts have
rejected traditional bases of liability such as breach of contract, finding
that a confidential relationship may impose "an additional duty springing
from but, extraneous to the contract and that the breach of such duty is
actionable in tort."412 This was the case in MacDonald v. Clinger,"' in
which a New York court granted recovery in tort for breach of confi-
407. Dean Prosser distinguished four separate areas warranting protection: "Intrusion
upon Seclusion," "Appropriation of Name or Likeness," "Publicity Given to Private
Life," and "Publicity Placing a Person in False Light." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRS §§ 652B-E (1977).
408. See Earl Warren & Lewis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
211 (1890).
409. ROBERTSON & NicoL, supra note 393, at 112 (enumerating elements of breach
of confidence claim).
410. 111 S.Ct. 2513 (1991).
411. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). After determining that "a contract
cause of action is inappropriate for these particular circumstances," the court went
on to address the question of, whether Cohen could establish a cause of action on
the theory of promissory estoppel. Id. The court rejected this claim, which was the
only basis of recovery considered in Cohen's appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. Thus, the court did not consider the existence of an actual contract between
the parties. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2516-18.
412. MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
413. Id.
dence arising from a physician-patient relationship after finding the tradi-
tional causes of action insuffient for purposes of the case at bar. In
MacDonald, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to sue his psy-
chiatrist for breach of confidence after the doctor revealed personal in-
formation disclosed during therapy sessions with the plaintiffs wife..""
While the plaintiff originally alleged damages arising from breach of con-
tract, breach of privacy, and breach of confidence, the court found that
only the last cause of action adequately addressed the implied duties
arising from the confidential relationship at issue, contending that it was
"obvious then that this relationship gives rise to an implied covenant
which, when breached, is actionable."4"' The court then proceeded to
note that recovery under a contract theory would unfairly limit the
plaintiff's recovery to economic losses, thereby depriving him of damages
for the pain and embarrassment of the physician's disclosure.16 What
distinguishes the MacDonald decision from other cases which recognize
the breach of confidence tort is that the MacDonald court recognized
that recovery is not necessarily limited to instances in which the defen-
dant has breached the express terms of a confidential relationship. Rath-
er, the court found that the relationship in dispute was one of trust and
confidence "out of which sprang a duty not to disclose. The defendant's
breach was not merely a broken contractual promise but a violation of a
fiduciary responsibility to the plaintiff implicit in and essential to the
doctor-patient relationship." '
The MacDonald court's finding that a tort duty may arise out of, yet
remain independent from, an express contract sent a strong message that
public policy may protect those who would otherwise find themselves
the victims of a vague or ambiguous agreement. However, the majority of
courts recognizing the breach of confidence tort have refrained from
adopting MacDonald's bold approach."8 Instead, these courts have re-
lied on traditional bases of liability or applied both approaches by recog-
nizing breach of confidence as one of several possible theories of recov-
ery."" The latter approach was employed by the Alabama Supreme
414. Id. at 802.
415. Id. at 804-05.
416. Id. at 804.
417. Id, at 805 (emphasis added).
418. Id.
419. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 289-90 (Idaho 1961)
(considering various public policy rationales which might impose actionable duty in
tort, but basing its ultimate holding on finding of implied contract liability). Cf.
Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1975). Addressing a claim of breach of confi-
dence arising out of a playright's unapproved use of a story idea, the California
Supreme Court was careful to note that it "has never ruled that a cause of action
for breach of confidence can rest upon a basis other than a contract that protects
that confidence." Id. at 1163. The court chose not to upset its own precedent, defer-
[Vol. 20: 115, 1992] Confidential Source Agreements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Court in Home v. Patton.' In Home, the court addressed three bases
of liability arising from a physician's unconsented disclosure of private
medical information to a patient's employer. The plaintiff sought damag-
es for the traditional torts of invasion of privacy and breach of implied
term of contract, as well as for breach of a confidential relationship. The
court treated all three counts as matters of first impression and found
that each would support the plaintiff's claims of damages."1 In an at-
tempt to rationalize the breach of confidence tort, the Home court em-
phasized that the confidential physician-patient relationship carries with
it certain inherent benefits which would be sacrificed if doctors were
permitted to "promiscuously disclose" information obtained in the course
of treatment.' Like MacDonald, Hoe recognized that certain confi-
dential relationships necessarily impose a positive duty upon profession-
als to refrain from disclosing confidential information for the benefit of
the immediate parties and, as a matter of public policy, to protect
society's interest in the value of confidential relations.'
As the MacDonald court aptly stated, confidential relationships normal-
ly carry a legal duty.' However, there may be instances when a breach
of confidence would not be justified. Accordingly, British law developed
the public interest defense. A defendant seeking protection on the basis
of public interest might claim this defense in any one of at least four
instances: (1) where law compels disclosure; (2) where there is a public
duty to disclose; (3) where the interests of the defendant demand disclo-
sure; and (4) where the source expressly or implicitly consents to the
disclosure." Generally, the public interest defense as it would apply to
ring to the trial court's finding that a cause of action for breach of confidence was
indeed a viable theory of recovery. Id.
420, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973).
421. Id. at 827-31.
422. Id. at 827.
423. 394.Id at 828.
424. See Susan A. v. County of Sonoma, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that a forensic psychologist's statement to reporter about interview with
juvenille amstee sustained breach of confidence claim); see also Harley v. Druzba,
565 N.Y.S.2d 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding social worker-client relationship suffi-
cient to establish cause of action for breach of confidence); MacDonald v. Clinger,
446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
425. For a complete discussion of the possible defenses to a breach of confidence
action, see Vickery, supra note 392, at 1462-68 (explaining limitations to claim of
breach of confidence, including traditional privileges and First Amendment freedoms).
See also Stephen L Grant, In the Public Interest? The Disclosure of Confidential
Information, 6 J. MEDIA L AND PRAC. 178, 183 (1986) (suggesting when the proposed
the press requires the media defendant to show that the need for public
disclosure of confidential information clearly outweighs the source's
interest in keeping the information secret.'
Although the United States has been hesitant to follow British law,
breach of confidence is a workable solution to the conflicts arising from
the contract, promissory estoppel, and First Amendment models.' The
decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. warrants serious examination of
this tort. As some media commentators warn, the courts will likely see
an increase in claims for breach of reporter-source agreements.' If this
is indeed the effect, the doctrinal limitations of a breach of confidence
tort effectively correspond to the balance which courts must maintain
between the need to protect an individual's right to confidentiality and
the fear of setting a low threshold for recovery which would increase the
likelihood of unmeritorious claims. As a result of adopting this tort,
courts will no longer need to deal with breach of confidence claims in a
piecemeal manner by applying other theories of liability which do not
adequately address the implied duties of a confidential relationship. The
breach of confidence tort reflects society's general interest in the protec-
tion of private information. However, in contrast to the rigid laws of
contracts, the contours of this tort also respect the obligation of the
press to provide important information about government, political fig-
ures, private persons, and private organizations by recognizing certain
well-established privileges. On the other hand, breach of confidence is
more restrictive than the sweeping approach of the First Amendment
model which affords the press almost absolute protection in the dissemi-
nation of newsworthy information. The tort recognizes that in compelling
cases of injurious disclosures, the press must be held accountable for its
actions to protect the broad societal interests in the sanctity of promises
and confidentiality.4"
The rationales behind traditional theories of liability for breach of a
confidential relationship only partially overlap with the interests at stake
tort would permit the publication of confidential information).
426. See Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank [19241 1 KB. 461, 473
(Eng. C.A.) (Bankes, LJ.) (setting forth the standard for application of the public in-
terest defense in the banking industry). While Tournier examined the public interest
defense in the context of business litigation, the obligation of confidence arising from
a reporter/source agreement is sufficiently analogous to warrant consideration of this
defense.
427. See ROBERMSON & NICOL, supra note 393, at 117 (finding that disclosure may
be warranted in the name of public interest).
428.. See, e.g., Vicini, supra note 13 (commenting on spokesperson for Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press who predicts floodgate of lawsuits in the after-
math of Cohen).
429. See generally supra text accompanying notes 189-207.
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in a reporter-source relationship. A confidential source has both an ex-
pectation of protection from unconsented disclosure and a reliance inter-
est in remaining free from the resulting damages should a reporter reveal
her identity. The first interest is all but ignored by the First Amendment
model, and the second interest is not adequately protected by contract
theories that limit recovery to direct economic losses. In the absence of
a breach of confidence tort, most courts continue to apply a tangle of
inconsistent remedies to the detriment of society's interest in protecting
the sanctity of mutual agreements. Yet some courts have wisely recog-
nized that traditional theories simply beg the question of when courts
should hold the press accountable for its promises. As breach of confi-
dence begins to emerge as a basis for liability, those courts that have yet
to adopt this cause of action should take note of the societal interests
served when confidential relationships are protected by the establish-
ment of a distinct theory in tort.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cohen, the Supreme Court found that a reporter's promise to pro-
vide anonyndty in exchange for a source's delivery of newsworthy infor-
mation contained the ,essential elements of an offer, acceptance, and
consideration for the purposes of a contract claim.n The decision drew
immediate criticism from media groups, who complained that the
majority's opinion signals the Court's readiness to legislate newsroom
ethics." Critics of Cohen fear that a focus on journalism ethics will re-
sult in a gradual retreat from the traditional freedoms guaranteed to the
press under the First Amendment. However, ethical concerns are neces-
sarily intertwined with the professional interests of journalists"2 and,
430. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2517-19 (1991).
431. See Vicini, supra note 13; see generally Richard A. Gonzales, Pyrrhic Victories
and Glorious Defeats: Why Defendants Are Winning and Plaintiffs Are Losing the
Struggle Over Actual Malice and "Fictionalized" Quotations, 22 ST. MARY's LJ. 1037
(1991) (suggesting high costs of litigating media ethics demand a tempered approach
to issues concerning press morality).
432. Industrywide standards for journalists first appeared in the early twentieth
century in an effort to impose a uniform code of ethics upon the press. Robert J.
Sheran & Barbara S. Isaacman, Do We Want a Responsible Press?: A Call for the
Creation of Self-Regulatory Mechanisms, 8 WM. MITCHELL L REV. 1, 96-97 (1982). See
also Lynn W. Hartman, Project Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their
Character, and Their Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L REv. 637, 679-80 (1987) (in
response to industry survey, 107 out of 182 editors report that their newsrooms are
governed by some form of internal written standards).
therefore, constitute a legitimate subject matter for court opinion. The
more critical issue arising from the reporter-source dilemma is whether,
by addressing the ethical standards of the press, courts project values
that are inconsistent with the First Amendment or merely seek to clarify
and enforce standards previously established by the media.
The written codes of industry associations such as the American Soci-
ety of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) and the Society of Professional Jour-
nalists (SPJ) recognize the need to regulate behavior when a breach of
ethics may threaten another's rights or cause injury.' However, the
standards set forth by organizations such as ASNE and SPJ are neither
rigid nor detailed, but are instead general guidelines for ethical behavior.
For example, the SPJ code is premised on broad categories such as "Respon-
sibility," "Ethics," and "Freedom of the Press."' Such vagueness and
imprecision has caused some critics to question the impact of written
codes of ethics on the practical concerns of modem journalists."8
While critics of the Cohen decision contend that the Supreme Court
might be attempting to fill in the gaps provided by industry codes, there-
by subjecting the press to stricter scrutiny than it would apply to other
persons or professions,' the majority opinion flatly rebuts this notion.
The Court reasoned that the newspapers themselves determined the
scope of their legal obligations and, therefore, the reporters imposed
upon themselves any restrictions placed on the publication of Cohen's
story. 7 While this justification would apply to most contractual rela-
tions, it is does not adequately respond to the unique dilemmas arising
433. See Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 432, at 97-99; Hartman, supra note 432, at
638, 695-99 (reprinting codes of ASNE and SPJ).
434. See Hartman, supra note 432, at 697-98. Similarly, the ASNE Statement of
Principles groups six articles under the broad titles, "Responsibility," "Freedom of the
Press," "Independence," "Truth and Accuracy," "Impartiality," and "Fair Play." Id. at
695-96.
435. In his concurring opinion in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), Justice
Frankfurter relied upon the often quoted words of H. L. Mencken to summarize his
feelings about the power of media codes:
Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine. Essentially, they are as absurd
as would be codes of street-car conductors, barbers or public jobholders. If
American journalism is to be purged of its present swinishness and brought
up to a decent level of repute-and God knows that such an improvement is
needed-it must be accomplished by the devices of morals, not by those of
honor. That is to say, it must be accomplished by external forces, and
through the medium of penalties exteriorly inflicted.
Id. at 365 n.13 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
436. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2521 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (declaring that enforcement of Minnesota's doctrine of promissory es-
toppel unfairly punishes the press for publication of truthful information).
437. Id. at 2519.
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from a voluntary agreement between a reporter and her source, for the
latter is unavoidably intertwined with important First Amendment con-
cerns. Finding it necessary to subject the Pioneer Press and Star Tri-
bune to the principles of promissory estoppel, ' the Supreme Court ap-
peared to equate media codes of ethics, which are rooted in the First
Amendment, with a fundamental tenet of contract law. Such an equation
is unsettling and will likely lead to fear among journalists that the philo-
sophical tone of industry codes no longer protects the press from vexa-
tious litigation.' In the wake of Cohen, it now appears that the ab-
sence of procedures for the specific enforcement of the media codes
places a heightened degree of responsibility upon editors to ensure that a
reporter's behavior meets the ethical standards of society at large and
not just those specifically reserved for the journalism profession." '
Just as media industry codes are not absolute protective devices for
journalists, neither should the general principles of contract law always
require the press to conceal the identity of a confidential source. The
potential threat to a source's privacy interests coupled with the First
Amendment rights of a free press warrants legal protection of both par-
ties. While the factual scenario of Cohen lends itself well to an applica-
tion of the theory of promissory estoppel,"' the growing dependence
438. Id. at 2518-19. The Court stated that
[t]here can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel
is a law of general applicability. It does not target or single out the press.
Rather, in so far as we ar advised, the doctrine is generally applicable to the
daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment does
not forbid its application to the press.
Id,
439. See Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. See also Hartman, supra note 432, at 643
(some members of the press fear that specific standards imposed by newspapers
would offer powerful ammunition to plaintiffs in libel actions). Several prominent
cases demonstrate a trend toward finding liability on the part of a media defendant
when internal communications exdst. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538,
570-71, 583-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (editor's memorandum to reporter provided evidence of
media defendant's state of mind and supported denial of motion for summary judg-
ment); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (office commu-
nication cited as evidence supporting court's finding of actual malice).
440. Cf. Hartman supra note 432, at 640 (media codes merely set forth lofty princi-
ples without the means of self-enforcement).
441. The Court found that the reporter's promise to keep Dan Cohen's identity
secret provided the offer, acceptance, and consideration necessary to establish a
contract. Se Cohen V, 111 S. CL at 2518-19 (applying Minnesota's law of promissory
estoppel).
upon confidential sources during the past two decades"2 suggests that
courts will face numerous fact patterns, some of which will warrant
increased protection of the media's First Amendment right to gather and
report newsworthy stories.
The issue decided by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen was
whether the First Amendment grants immunity from liability for damages
caused when the press breaks its promises."3 This Comment has sug-
gested that courts must look beyond the historical notions of First
Amendment immunity and yet resist the temptation to analyze the report-
er-source relationship as one rooted in traditional contract law. The gap
between tort and contract is not so expansive that the sometimes con-
flicting interests of journalists and their sources cannot be fairly resolved
in a court of law. On the contrary, this narrowing gap provides fertile
ground for the development of a standard that incorporates the unique
features of the reporter-source relationship and avoids the application of
easy absolutes illustrated by the First Amendment and contract models.
It is likely that courts will increasingly confront compelling cases of
source disclosures. As the political arena continues to be dominated by
negative campaigning, which includes the discovery of closet skeletons
by tapping anonymous sources, 4 courts must reexamine the bases of
liability when the press breaks promises of confidentiality. Although the
tort is still in the developing stages, breach of confidence appears to be a
viable alternative to traditional legal models. Further development of this
tort is warranted since reporters increasingly face scenarios in which
revealing the identity of a source may have a significant impact on the
newsworthiness of a story, thereby affecting the press' primary functions
as educators and critics of our democratic society. This Comment pro-
poses that the vagueness, secrecy, and ambiguity typically associated
with reporter-source agreements command a heightened degree of aware-
ness of the competing values underlying the First Amendment and con-
tract law, and that an examination of this unique relationship should
serve as the starting point for any legal analysis.
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442. See supra notes 122-26.
443. Cohen V, 111 S. Ct. at 2515.
444. See SABATO, supra note 66, at 99-100 (contending that all major presidential
campaign rumors in recent history can be traced to "partisan operatives").
